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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents a study of a class of stochastic
dynamic games, characterized by alternate decision-making by the
players. This class of games is termed Stackelberg games; the games
considered involve only two players. Within this class of games,
several types of solutions are discussed; two of these solutions are
studied in detail: closed-loop equilibria and signaling-free equili-
bria.
The problem of finding closed-loop equilibria in general sto-
chastic dynamic Stackelberg games is discussed in detail. Necessary
conditions for the existence of equilibria are derived, based on
similar developments in control theory. A stage-by-stage decomposition
is used to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium solution.
A new class of equilibria, signaling-free equilibria, is defined
by restricting the type of information available to the players. In
a general formulation, sufficient conditions for the existence of
equilibria are established, based on a stage-by-stage dynamic program-
ming decomposition. Under the conditions of equivalent information for
both players, an equivalence between signaling-free equilibria and
closed-loop equilibria is established.
Signaling-free equilibria are studied for a special class of
stochastic dynamic games, characterized by linear state and measurement
equations, quadratic cost functionals, and gaussian uncertainties. For
this class of games, signaling-free equilibrium strategies are estab-
lished as affine functions of the available information. Under re-
strictions to the available information, signaling-free equilibria can
be obtained in closed-form, described in a fashion similar to optimal
control theory. The resulting equilibrium strategies resemble in part
the "certainty-equivalence" principle in optimal control.
Various examples throughout the work illustrate the results
-2-
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obtained. Additionally, some introductory remarks discuss conceptual
algorithms to obtain these solutions. These remarks are part of a
closing discussion on applications and future research involving the
results of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER I
I.1 Introduction
With the introduction and availability of sophisticated com-
puting and modeling equipment in recent years, there has been a trend
among academic disciplines to formulate mathematical models to study
real-life situations. Among the physical sciences, this treatment is
adequate since they deal with measurable quantities in Nature and obey
certain known Mathematical relationships. Recently, the same treat-
ment has been extended to such disciplines as Behavioral Sciences,
Economics and Biology (S4, SH1). Interesting research has been con-
ducted which attempts to characterize living systems in terms of lan-
guage and ideas derived from the physical sciences. However, these
systems are not understood to the degree where accurate laws of
behavior can be formulated. There is conflict as to which are the
relevant units of measure, variables and their proper scaling; these
factors introduce a strong element of uncertainty associated with the
models.
This trend in the social sciences has opened broad areas of
application for Control Theory. Control Theory as a science concerns
itself with making optimal decisions; this concept has a natural
application to models of Economic and Social systems where policy
decisions must be made. However, the decision problems which arise
from these systems are different from the "classical" decision
problems of the physical sciences. A "classical" decision problem is
illustrated in Figure I.1. One decision maker observes the outputs of
a system and uses them to choose inputs which cause the system to
behave in a desired fashion.
-r outputs
System
Decision 
Maker
decisions
Figure I.1
An important aspect of models in the Behavioral Sciences is
that decisions are often made by different persons using individual
information. Thus, a theory of generalized decision making which
subsumes "classical" decision problems must be developed to treat
these problems. This dissertation deals with a subclass of mathemati-
cal problems originating from these models, which are classified under
the name of games; these problems differ from classical decision
problems in the fact that different information is available to the
decision makers, and each decision maker may have different goals.
I.2 Game Theory
Game theory is a method for the study of decision making in
situations of conflict (SHl). It deals with processes in which the
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individual decision-unit is not in complete control of the other deci-
sion units entering into the environment. The essence of a game is
that it involves decision makers with different objectives and infor-
mation whose fates are intertwined. A team problem (H2, H3, R1) is
a game where all decision makers have a common objective. When deci-
sion makers act at more than one occasion, and there is an order
introduced in these decisions, the optimization problem is known as a
dynamic problem.
A game is described in terms of the players, the payoffs and
the rules. A player is an autonomous decision-making unit in control
of some resources. The rules of the game specify how these resources
may be utilized, what information is available, and all other relevant
aspects of the environment. A strategy is a set of instructions which
states in advance how a player intends to select each move, taking into
account the knowledge he will have available at the time he is called
upon to select his move. It takes into account all contingencies and
provides instructions on how to act under every circumstance. A payoff
function for player i assigns a valuation to each complete play of the
game, for player i; this payoff will in general depend on the rules of
the game and the decisions of all the players.
There are two ways in which games are represented: in a compact
manner called the normal form (VN1, L1), and in a descriptive manner
called the extensive form (VN1, K1, K2, Aul). The normal form of the
game identifies each complete play of the game by the decisions made,
and hence it consists of a vector-valued function which assigns a
payoff to each player for each possible combination of decisions (or
strategies). It transcends the rules of the game, directly relating
decisions to payoffs. The extensive form of the game is a detailed
description of how the game is a detailed description of how the game
is played which incorporates both temporal order and available infor-
mation. Von Neumann and Morgernstern (VN]) introduced the notion of
games in normal and extensive form. Kuhn and others (K1, K2, Aul,
Wt2) developed the concept further.
The normal and extensive forms of a game describe the inter-
connection of the players' decision to their cost. However, there is
no concept yet of what is a solution to a game. When only one deci-
sion maker is present, or there is a common goal, the solution to the
game can be defined as the set of decision which optimizes this goal.
In the general case where different goals exist, there is no unique
concept of a solution; each solution concept carries certain assump-
tions as to the philosophy motivating the decision-makers. Thus, in
order to pose properly the optimization problem in a game, the game
must be specified in its normal or extensive form, and the desired
solution concept must be specified also. Throughout the remainder of
this work the term solution concept will denote the assumptions
defining a solution to a game.
I.3 Summary of Thesis
Research in dynamic game theory to date is full of apparent
contradictions and confusing results (Ba3, Sa2). A large part of
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these problems is due to the adaptation of concepts and techniques
developed for nondynamic games and control theory to dynamic games.
The present work is aimed at establishing various results using control-
theory ideas in a rigorous framework for dynamic games, attempting to
clarify many of these points of conflict. A mathematical formulation
for the class of dynamic games considered is presented in Chapter II.
Within this formulation, several solution concepts are defined,
including some concepts which arise naturally out of a dynamic formu-
lation. These concepts are looked at from a game-theoretic point of
view, resulting in interpretations of these concepts in terms of
extensive and normal forms of games. These interpretations provide
considerable insight into the differences between the solution con-
cepts. The chapter concludes with the development of some results
characterizing these concepts.
In Chapter III, several examples are discussed which illustrate
the results obtained in Chapter II. In particular, several of the
games described illustrate the dominant assumptions of some solution
concepts, and how this dominance is affected by uncertainties in the
system.
Chapters IV and V deal with games of imperfect information.
Two solution concepts are studied in this context; these concepts
have the feature that decisions are not made simultaneously at any
stage. Chapter V is a study of a subclass of problems of this type,
whose solution can be expressed in closed form for one solution
concept. Sufficient conditions are given for the existence and
-13-
uniqueness of this solution.
Chapter IV addresses a general class of problems with imperfect
information. Several results are established characterizing the
solutions sought under two different solution concepts. Under some
constraints in the information, these two solution concepts are
similar. The validity of a dynamic programming (B1) approach towards
obtaining these solutions is established.
Chapter VI contains several comments on open problems left
in the area, and summarizes the results of the previous chapter.
I.4 Contributions of Thesis
The major contributions of this research are:
1. The formulation of the various solution concepts considered in
a dynamic framework.
2. The development and clarification of the properties of these
solutions.
3. The introduction of important examples.
4. The formulation of solution concepts for games of imperfect
information.
5. The extension of dynamic programming techniques to games of
imperfect information.
6. Formulation and conceptual solution of general games with
imperfect information.
7. Exact solution for a subclass of games with imperfect information
under one solution concept.
CHAPTER II
Dynamic Games
In this chapter a mathematical framework is provided for the
study of dynamic games. Different solution concepts are studied within
this framework; several relationships are derived between these solu-
tion concepts. Additionally, the chapter includes an overview of
results available in dynamic games.
II.1 Mathematical Formulation
The systems studied are described by a state equation
1 m (2.1)
Xt+l = ft(xt, u t , ... ut, t ) ; t = 0, ... N-l (2.1)
where xt Xt, ut £ U t £ (Rp , BP); (Xt, Gt), (Ut, G) are measur-
able spaces, where the o-fields G t contains all sets of the form {ut},
and {x} £ G0 for xt £ Xt u £ U. RP is the p-th dimensional realt t t t t t
space, BP the c-field of Borel sets, and 0t is a random variable taking
its values in RP. The function ft is a measurable function with res-
0 1 m p 0
pect to the product c-field Gt x G x ... G x B to Gt+1 .t t t t+l'
There are m measurement equations, given by
i i i
Yi = it(xt' it), i = 1, ..., m, t = 0, ... N-1 (2.2)
i q i
where t are random variables with values in (Rq , B q ) and gt is jointly
t t
measurable from the product c-field G x Bq into the measurable space
(Yt Dt), where {yt} 6 DI for all yt Yt-
t t t t t t
The equations can be interpreted as follows: equation (2.1)
-14-
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models some uncertain dynamical system and how it is affected by
decision from the players. The variable xt represents the possible
states of the system, ut are the inputs, and Ot represents the sto-
chastic effects present. Equation (2.2) represents the information
acquired by each player at stage t. The total information available
to player i at stage t is denoted zt. Measurement uncertainties are
tmodeled by the random vectors it. It is assumed that all of the
uncertain variables are defined on an underlying probability space
(Q, F , P ), and have a known joint probability distribution.
Associated with the system is a set of equations describing the
individual costs:
N-1
i i 1
J = h(x N ) + hit( x t , t .. ut ); im (2.3)
t=0
when h i is an appropriately measurable function into the positivet
real numbers.
The information set zt consists of the rules and parameters of
the game (the passive information, which is the same to all players
at all stages) and the active information gathered from observation
of the other players' decisions and player i's measurements of the
state of the system. It is assumed that every player can observe
exactly the other players' past decisions; this assumption can be
relaxed as discussed in Chapter VI. The information set zi differs
from ZT, i y j, tf T, only in the active information, so the symbol
zt will be used to represent the active information for player i at
time t.
-16-
i i 1 m m 
From its definition, zt Zt = U x ... U0 x ... Ut 1 x Y x .
..Yi A control law for each player i at time t is a map
t'
i i i
y:Z 3U
t t t
i i 1 m
which is measurable from the product O-field DO x ... Dt x GO x ...Gt_1
into GT. Control laws are also referred to as strategies.
The set of admissible strategies rt for player i at time t is a
subset of the set of all strategies it. The strategies Ykik=,...m
can be used together with equations (2.1) and (2.2) to define zt as a
random variable in terms of the probability space (Q, F , P ). The
i
measurability of the maps produces a well-defined random variable zt 
1 m i i
measurable on the field G0 x ... Gt_ 1 x D x ... D . This field
induces a C-field Ft ( F in Q (D1) through the random variable z.
The dependence of this induced field on {Ykk=,. .mt- will be denoted
by F({ i=l,...m)· Thus, strategies can alternately be defined
as functions -+ U:R measurable on Ft k The c-field
i i i=l,...m
Ft Yki=O,..t-l )represents the information available to player i at
time t about the uncertainties in the system, following the strategies
iY.-=l,. .. . The notation used to represent strategies in this
k k=O, ... t-l
alternate form will be
It = Yt k' ¥k =O,...t-l
to indicate the dependence of the strategies on the previous strate-
gies. These two representations of admissible strategies will be used
alternately throughout the remainder of the thesis.
-17-
A complete play of the game can be uniquely defined by speci-
fying the values ut= . of all the decision and the values of
all the random elements, as follows: Equation (2.1) can be used to
define the values of xt for all t. Then, equation (2.3) defines a cost
vector J = (J1 , ...Jm). This cost vector is a function of the values
jutit~o N-1 and the uncertainties (which can be specified by
choosing an element EC Q); hence, by the measurability assumptions,
this cost vector is a well-defined random variable in the probability
space (Q, F , P ).
A complete play can be alternately defined by specifying the
iwi=l ,...m
strategies itt,.t- used by the players throughout the game;
t=0,...t-l
and a value for the random elements. Once the value of the random
element W is known, then y0 can be computed from equation (2.2). This
value can be used to define z0, and then the values uO = Y0(z ) can
be computed for all i. Equation (2.1) then provides the value of xl.
This procedure can be used recursively, defining xt, then
i i ii
Yt and zt, thereby specifying ut =Y (zt). The values xt and ut are
then used in equation (2.3) to define a cost vector in terms of W, and
the choice of strategies ¥Yt . The measurability assumptions
stated earlier assure that this cost vector J(y ) is a
random vector well-defined in the probability space (2, FO, P0 ).
There is a subtle difference between these two ways of speci-
fying a complete play of the game. The earlier way treats the deci-
sions as known constants, whereas the latter way treats ut as a
variable depending on the information; i.e. a random variable. The
latter specification includes the earlier as a special case when only
i i i i 
constant strategies Y(z ) = u for all z 6 Zt ) are considered.t t t t 
This distinction is very important when dealing with the way fields
are induced in 2.
A game is called deterministic if the field induced on 2 by the
original random elements x, t t the trivi.N-a
a-field (~, Q). That is, there are no uncertainties in the state
evolution and measurement equations. A solution concept is a set of
criteria which a set of strategies tt=...N-1 must meet in order
to be considered a solution to the game. Solution concepts include
assumptions about how each player chooses his strategy and what
classes of strategies he chooses from. The remainder of this thesis
deals with solution concepts for two types of games: games where
decisions u1 are enacted simultaneously at each stage, termed Nash
t
games in connection with the Nash equilibrium concept proposed by
Nash in (Nl, N2); and games where some ut are enacted (and observed
by the remaining players) prior to other ut, termed Stackelberg games
in reference to the work of Von Stackelberg (VS1). Throughout the
remainder of this work the number of players is assumed to be two;
in most cases, this represents no loss in generality. Additionally,
it is assumed that each player has perfect recall of his own informa-
i
tion; that is, for any t, the information vector zt+l contains all of
the elements of the information vector zt for any play of the game.
-19-
As a final note, the symbol ut will be used to denote both the value
of yt(z') and the constant strategy Yt(z ut for all Zt; this
distinction will be made when necessary to avoid confusion.
II.2 Solution Concepts in Dynamic Nash Games
Solution concepts are discussed in this chapter for two classes
of games: Nash games and Stackelberg games. The basic difference
between these two classes is that in Nash games decisions at stage t
are chosen and enacted simultaneously by both players, while in Stack-
elberg games these conditions do not hold.
Three solution concepts are relevant for Nash games: the first
discussed is the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. Assume that
each player seeks to minimize his cost.
Definition II.1. An open-loop equilbrium in a Nash game is a pair of
= (1*U 2* 2* 
decision sequences u = ut with
t=0: .,. .N-1 t = 0, . ·
i N-1 i
the property that, for all u C T U t
t=o t
1 1* 2* 1 1 2*
E{J (u1' u } < E{J (u , u)} (2.4)
2 1* 2* 2 1* 2E{J2 (u u)} < E{J2 (u , u)} (2.5)
where the expectations are defined in terms of the original probability
0 0
space (Q, F , P ) as described in Section II.1.
The open-loop Nash equilibria assume that no information is
acquired through the play of the game; hence the admissible strategies
are constant strategies. This solution concept is used primarily in
-20-
deterministic games. In the presence of uncertainty, the closed-loop
Nash equilibrium concept is more appropriate.
Definition II.2. A closed-loop equilibrium is a pair of admissible
1* 2*
strategy sequences Iy , , such that, for all admissible strategy
i N-1 i
sequences e rT rt'
t=O
1 1* 2* 1 1 2*
E{J (Y , )}<E{J (Y , )} (2.6)
2 1* 2* 2 * 2 (2.7)E{J (Y , )}< E{J 1 ( y} (2.7)
where J , J are defined as random variables in terms of (Q, F , P )
as described in Section II.1.
It should be noticed that the admissible strategies in Defini-
tion II.2 could be of either form discussed in Section II.1. To
^i i i
eliminate this ambiguity, let Y :Zt - U represent strategies which
i x1 2 1
map available information to decisions, and Yt : x r x r x ... rt x
t 0 0 t-l
2 i
rt1 U represent strategies expressed in terms of the original
t-l t
space (Q, F , P ).
The major difference between the open-loop and closed-loop
equilibria is that in the open-loop concept admissible strategies do
not depend on active information (they are constant); whereas in the
closed-loop concept they may be nonconstant functions of the available
information. The active information zt has the values of the measure-
ments Ykk=,...t and the past decisions by both players,
Uk k=O,. .t . Since this is a Nash game, it does not include
knowledge of the current decision by ,...t-
knowledge of the current decision by the other player because both
-21-
players enact their decisions simultaneously.
The last Nash solution concept of interest is the signaling-
free Nash equilibrium concept. The philosophy behind this concept is
that decisions can be made independently at each stage t and need not
be made until the game is at stage t. Define the reduced cost Jt as:
N-1
i i 1 2
Ji = hh(x , u) (2.8)
t . (xj uN , u j=t j j j
Definition II.3. A signaling-free strategy for player i at stage t
in a Nash game is a map
i 1 2 1 2 i
Y,:Q xUv xUv x. . xU U+ U¥t:( x U 0x U0 x .. t-l x t-1 t
with the following properties:
(i) t ( {u}kuJj l' 2 ) is measurable from
7t · , k]k=0,...t-l
iFt ({URk-O ) to Gt.Ft is the field induced by the measurements Yk ...
on Q assuming constant strategy Uk.
(ii) For each w E Q, Yt(w, ' ) is measurable from
1 2 1 2 i
Go x G0 x ... x G x Gt_ 1 to Gt-
i O 1 2(iii) Yt( ) is jointly measurable from F x G x G to
Gt
The name signaling-free refers to the fact that information about
the uncertainties in the space (0
the uncertainties in the space (Q, F , p ) is acquired only through
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the measurements Y; the decisions ut are assumed to be constant
strategies in defining the information a-field Ft ({uj ),
thus they contain no information about P.
Notation: Let Yt represent the sequence of strategies {y k=},...t
Similarly, ut is a sequence of constant strategies. Also, let
i i i
y represent the sequence of strategies Y ... Y Having intro-
-L~t t N-l'
duced the concept of signaling-free strategies, the next step is to
verify how the signaling-free assumptions get reflected in the costs.
Equation (2.8) defines partial costs starting from any stage t. In
-- i ( U N_21 2
particular, for any UN_2 define J (N-1 N-1 Y as a random
variable on Q using the state evolution equation (2.1); relate xt_ 1
0 0
to (Q, F , P ) through the constant strategies UN-2 in Equation 2.1.
Then, for any w £ Q,
i - 1 2 () 1 -
y2( ~--) +hi(f= xN ) (W, (( ) 1 '-
YN-1(' N-2) N( N-1( XN-1( )' YN1(' uN-2)'
YN-1 'h N-2 ' )
It is a well-defined random variable in terms of c because of the
measurability assumptions on ht and ft. With these preliminaries one
can define appropriate costs.
Definition II.4. The expected cost-to-go for player i at stage t is
a function It with the following properties:
-23-
i 1 2 1 2 1 2(i) It: X UO x x ... x x t x r r ...
1 2
N-1 N-1
(ii) I ("- 1 2
(ii) N-1 (i ' UN-2' ¥N-i' YN-2)
N-i N-2' N-' YN-1 -  N-
i - 1 2 i 1 2
(i t( utl, t' t) = E{ht(xt, ut, ut)
t+l i (C u+1' +)Z t i Yt(, ut 1),j=1,2}
(2.10)
where the expectations in equations (2.9) and (2.10) are conditional
expectations in terms of the fields F1 (u and the substitutions
i j
ut Yt(w, Ut_1) are used to define the random variable inside the
conditional expectation in (2.10). It is assumed that ut_1 is con-
sistent with z..
It is expressed in terms of conditional expectations defined on
fields induced by the information z t(). The value of these expecta-
tions can be expressed in terms of zt, instead of w. That is, there
^ii ZF1 2 1 2
exists a function It:Z x r x rt x .. x r R such thatt t t t N-i N-i
(L1)
^ i ( .,1 i 1 2
It(zt(c)', It' ) = It(' Ut-l' Lt' , t) a.e.
Both representations of the expected cost-to-go will be used further
on.
i - 1 2
The function It( · , ut_1, , *t) is not defined uniquely in Q;
rather, it is defined within an equivalence class of P -null functions.
-24-
Hence it must be made clear when dealing that any equations dealing
i ^i
with the functions It or I will relate only to this equivalence class;t t
this will be denoted by the words almost everywhere (a.e.). With
these preliminaries, a signaling-free Nash equilibrium can be defined
as:
Definition II.5.: A signaling-free equilibrium in a hlash game is a
pair of admissible strategy sequences Y , y2, with the property
. 2
that, for any admissible strategy sequences L , Y ,
i - 1* 2* 1 - 1 2*
It(w, u t ' Ut-l' Y]- It <t' Yt a-e (2.11)
2 - 1* 2* 2 - 1* 2
It (Wr Ut-1 Y I I (W, Ut-l' It ) a.e. (2.12)
' t--t _-' t
t- 1 2
for all t E 0, ... N-l, all u 7 Uk x U
k=0 k k
The conditional expectation in equations (2.9) and (2.10) is
taken with the assumption that past decisions are known constants, as
opposed to results of strategies which are unknown. This reflects the
philosophy that decisions enacted at stage t are made independently of
past strategies and that a strategy for stage t need not be chosen
until stage t, based solely on the available information. In deter-
1 2
ministic games, or in stochastic games where zt = z for all t, signal-
ing free HIash equilibria are also closed-loop equilibria. However,
when zt 1 zt for all t, the possibility of transfer of information
exists (Sl, Tl); this is similar to signaling strategies in team
theory (Sl, R1, Sa3). In this case, signaling-free Nash equilibria
will not be closed-loop equilibria.
-25-
Various authors, notably Aumann and Maschler, and Ho (Au2, H4)
have pointed out the inadequacy of the closed-loop equilibrium solu-
tion in dynamic games; the introduction and definition of signaling-free
equilibria follows the spirit of these works. Under this solution
concept, the players do not commit themselves to choosing a strategy
until they have to enact it. Hence the equilibrium strategies must
be equilibrium strategies for any part of the game starting at stage t.
This is reflected in the definition by defining the equilibrium
strategies as sequences which are in equilibrium for costs-to-go at
all stages.
The other important aspect of the signaling-free assumption
lies in the restrictions imposed on learning about the uncertainties
through observation of the other player's decisions. This restriction
arises from the interpretation of the solution: at stage t, player i
seeks to minimize his expected cost-to-go, regardless of how previous
decisions were made. The values ut,1 are known to both players at
stage t, not the form of the strategies which produced those values.
Under the signaling-free solution, the players make no further assump-
tions as to the strategies which produced these values, treating them
as constant strategies.
II.3 Solution Concepts in Stackelberg Games
In the Stackelberg solution concepts decisions are not enacted
simultaneously at each stage. This creates a difference in information
between the two players, since the player who acts second knows the
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value of the first player's decisions. The player who acts first is
called the leader and the other player is called the follower. Within
the dynamic game context, three types of solution concepts are impor-
tant in Stackelberg games: open-loop Stackelberg solutions, closed-loop
Stackelberg solutions, and equilibrium solutions.
The open-loop Stackelberg solution assumes dominance of the game
by the leader; the leader chooses all of his decisions and announces
them to the follower, who then chooses his decisions. The dominance of
the leader is reflected in the assumption that he can predict the
follower's reactions to the leader's decisions.
2 lc 2
Definition II.6. Player l's rational reaction to Y , V (y ), is the
set of admissible strategies defined by
lc 2 10 l ll0 2) 1 2
V (Y) ={y £ TirtE{J ( < E{Jl ( ,X )}
_ - t
t
for all y1 7e r }
t
Player 2's rational reaction set is defined similarly. When only
constant strategies are admissible, V (u2 ) and V 2(u1 ) are used to
denote the players' rational reactions. The sets {( , V ()),
E f } and {(Y , V ( ))I, £ r} are known as the rational
t t
reaction sets for players 2 and 1, respectively.
Definition II.7. An open-loop Stackelberg solution is a pair of
1* 2*
decision sequences u , u such that
2* V2(i) u V(u')
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(ii) E{J1 1 2* 11 2(ii) E{Jl (u , u )} < E{J (u u2) }
1 1 2 21for all u E T U; u2 (u). (2.13)
t t
This definition differs slightly from the definitions given
previously in the literature (Bel, Sil, Si2). The previous definitions
were ambiguous if V (u1 ) contained more than one element u for each
u1. The open-loop Stackelberg concept is a dominant solution concept;
here in the definition used here, it is implied that whenever two
strategies yield an equal cost for the follower, he will choose the
one that minimizes the leader's cost. This strengthens the dominance
of the leader in this concept, while eliminating the ambiguity which
existed in previous definitions.
As indicated in the Nash solutions, the open-loop solutions are
used primarily when no information is acquired in the play of the game.
When information is acquired, the closed-loop Stackelberg concept is
more appropriate. The leader chooses and announces the strategy
sequence 1 to the follower who then chooses his strategy sequence
2 . Admissible strategies are defined as they were for the closed-
loop Nash equilibrium concept in terms of S.
Definition II.8. A closed-loop Stackelberg solution is a pair of
1* 2* 2* 2c 1*
admissible strategy sequences y , - , such that y £ V (7 ) , and
11* 2* 11 2
E{J (y , y )} < E{JJ ( }
1 2 2C() 1.for all y 1 iT 2 Vc (Y ). (2.14)
t
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The closed-loop Stackelberg solution also assumes complete
dominance by the leader; the major difference in the closed-loop and
open-loop solutions is the choice of strategies, as the open-loop
strategies are constant strategies. A difficulty associated with the
closed-loop Stackelberg solution is that equation (2.13) defines a
constrained functional minimization problem where the constraint set
is not of simple form. Thus, solutions which satisfy (2.13) are
difficult to find.
The third class of Stackelberg solutions is the equilibrium
Stackelberg solutions. The basic difference between this and the two
previous classes is that the leader is no longer assumed dominant.
Thus, an equilibrium between the leader and follower is desired. The
Stackelberg nature of the game arises in the fact that at each stage,
the leader announces his decision to the follower before the follower
makes his decision. Three types of equilibria are considered: open-
loop, closed-loop and signaling-free. The definitions are analogous
to the Nash equilibrium solutions, with the difference that the
follower's information vector zt now includes knowledge of the leader's
..1
decision u t.
Since the open-loop equilibria does not use any information other
than that available before the start of the game, the open-loop equili-
bria are equilibria for both Stackelberg and Nash games. Since the
information provided by the leader's decision is not used, it makes no
difference whether they play simultaneously at each stage or whether
the leader plays first.
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Definition II.9. A closed-loop equilibrium strategy for a Stackelberg
game is a function
1 1 2 1 2 1
¥t:Q x 0 x F x x t x t-1 U
or
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Yt:Q X rO x rO x ... x r x r x rt - U2
1 - 1- 2 -
such that yt( , Yt) is measurable on Ft (Y_ ), and Yt ' Yt-1
2 .1 - 1 2 1 2
(t -1' Y1) for all yt £ rO X r X r X ris measurably on F t 1 for all x 0 x .. t x
Equivalently, because of the definition of the fields Ft , a
closed-loop strategy can be represented as a function of the informa-
tion zt. That is, a closed-loop strategy can be a function
"11 1 2 1 2 1 t2 2 1 2
Yt:Z t x r0 x r0 x x r tU 1 Y :Z x x ... x rt x
1 21't + U2 such that
Al 1 - 1
A2 2 - A 2 1
Yt (Z t (W) Y t-, ,= Yt Yt a.e.t t t-l' tt-
Definition II.10. A closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is a pair of
1* 2*
admissible strategy sequences y , y such that, for all admissible
Y, i = 1, 2,
1 1* 2* 1 1 2*E{J (y Y 2*)} < E{J (Y ,y2 )} (2.15)
2 1* 2* 2 1* 2 (2.16)
E{J2 (y , y )} < E{J2 (Y , )} (2.16)
Notice the difference in the field Ft between the closed-loop
equilibria in the Nash and the Stackelberg case. In the Stackelberg
2 1case, z contains knowledge of u . Thus, the equilibrium is over a
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different set of admissible strategies than the Nash equilibria.
Definition II.11. A signaling-free strategy in a Stackelberg game
for player 1 at stage t is a function y1:Q x U x U0 x ... x U 1 x
2 + 1 2 1 2 1Ut 1 Ut; for player 2 it is a function yt:Q x U 0x U2 x ... x Ut 1
2 1 2
Ut_ 1 x Ut Ut such that
1 - 2 - 1
(i) Y ( ut 1) and t( Ut l' ut) are measurable from
1 . 1 2- 1 2
t(u to G and F (Utl ut) to Gt respectively.
(ii) yi(, · ) is an appropriately measurable function.
t
(iii) t( , ) is jointly measurable in F and the
appropriate fields to G.
In a fashion similar to Nash games, expected costs-to-go are
defined as:
Definition II.12. The expected cost-to-go for player i at stage t
is a function It such that:
1 1 2 1 2 1 2(i) I :Q x U0 x U2 x ... U 1 x Ut 1 x r t x r2 x ...
.. N-l N-1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
(ii) It:Q X UO x ... Ut 1 x t x rt+ x ... x r R
--1 2 2 1 2 2
(iii) U N-1 = E{JN-1 UN-I YN-1) I ZN-1}
(2.17)
(iv) IN-1(w' uN2' YN-1' YN-l) = E{JN-i (YN-1 YN-1 N-1
(2.18)
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2 1 1 2 2 1 2
(v) It (w, Ut-l' Ut' ,t+l' t) = E{ht ut , Ut)
2+ 1 1 2 t2 1 = 1t+l ( ut Ut+l' -t+2' -t+1) lZt Ut+l t+l( )
2 2
ut Yt()} (2.19)
1 1 2 1 1 2
(vi) I t ut 1 Yt,) = E{ht (xt, ut, u )
1 - 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
+t (, u --t+l' --t+l)lzt', ut = t = )}
(2.20)
where the expectations in (2.17)-(2.20) are conditional expectations
defined in terms of the C-fields F (u
t t-l
The expressions for the expected costs-to-go in Definition II.12
are similar to those obtained for Nash games in Definition II.4; the
major difference lies in the information available to player 2, which
includes the value ut at stage t. In particular, the conditional
expectations are similarly defined, hence there exist functions
^1 1 1 2 1 2 ^2 2 2 1
It:Z t x x t x ... x N x N -+ Rand ItZ x - x t+ xt t N-l N-l t' t F t+l
..r1 + R such that
N-l
^l 1 1 2 1 1 2
It(zt (W), ) = It(jw Ut-l Yt' Yt) a.e.
A2 2 1 2 2 - 1 1 2
t(zt ' I t Ut-l'' t 1 t) a.e
Both of these representations of the expected costs-to-go will be used
in other chapters. A signaling-free equilibrium can be defined as:
Definition II.13. A signaling-free equilibrium is a pair of
1* 2*
admissible sequences y , _ such that for any admissible sequences
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1 - 1* 2* 1 1 2*
It( ut-' ^  ( - Yt -< It(w' Ut-' ,t Yt e. (2.21)
2 - 1 1* 2* 2 - 1 1* 2I ('U, u )s s. (2 22)
I (t ut-- 1 ' t--+l ) < It( ut_ 1 ut, 4+1 t)
for all t $ 0, ... N-l, all ut.
Note the inclusion of ut in (2.22), as opposed to equation
1 2(2.12). This is due to the fact that ut is known in zt in the Stackel-
berg game, while it is not known in the Nash game; hence the follower
can treat this value as a known constant instead of a random variable
produced by a strategy.
It is noteworthy that the concept of Stackelberg solutions in
static games has two different dynamic interpretations: the so-called
dominant interpretation, where the leader announces his entire
strategy sequence at the beginning of the game; and the equilibrium
interpretation, where at each stage the leader acts first, choosing
a decision for that stage. This difference will be highlighted in
Section II.5.
The comments made in the previous section about the Nash
equilibrium strategies also apply to the Stackelberg equilibrium
solutions. In cases of like information signaling-free equilibria
are also closed-loop equilibria. This will be proven in a rigorous
framework in Chapter IV. For deterministic games, additional relation-
ships can be derived between the different solution concepts. These
relationships are proven in Section II.6.
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II.4 An Overview of Dynamic Game Literature
The mathematical theory of games was first presented in Von
Neumann and Morgernstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in
1944. Although some work in the area of games had been done pre-
viously, this book is acknowledged to be the introduction of game
theory as a Mathematical science. It introduced the concepts of games
in normal and extensive form, and discussed the ideas leading to
various solution concepts of games. Their work was limited to finite
games (games with finite decision spaces), but the concepts they intro-
duced, such as equilibria, strategies and payoffs and their work in
zero-sum games permeates all of the game literature.
Kuhn further developed the idea of games in extensive form
(K1, K2) by describing the extensive form in a graph-theoretic fashion.
In (K2), Kuhn establishes conditions for the use of a dynamic pro-
gramming (Bl) approach to obtaining equilibria in games presented in
extensive form. Additionally, his formulation for extensive games
included the concept of information available to a decision maker, in
terms of information partitions. Although his work was restricted to
finite games, Kuhn's results are the backbone of most of the theory of
dynamic games with imperfect information.
The idea of looking for equilibrium points as solutions to
n-person games is traced to the work of John F. Nash (Nl, N2). In
his work, Nash proposed the equilibrium points as solutions in static
games where all players choose their strategies simultaneously. His
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name is commonly associated with equilibrium solution concepts in
games. Contrary to standard terminology, in this dissertation Nash's
name is used to indicate games where decisions are made simultaneously
by all players.
The idea of games where decisions are not made simultaneously
was used by H. Von Stackelberg (VSl). In his work, he discussed
the solution of a static economic problem where one decision maker
was constrained to wait for other decision maker's decisions before
making his own. The term Stackelberg game is used to denote this
class of games.
The theory of dynamic games was slow to evolve, with individual
results appearing sporadically. Rufus Isaacs (Il, I2) published his
works in Differential Games, where he used ideas associated with con-
trol theory and differential equations to solve games with dynamic
evolution. Isaacs' work led to a concerted effort by control scien-
tists and applied mathematicians to work on dynamic games. The games
Isaacs studied were primarily deterministic zero-sum games.
Ian Rhodes, David Luenberger and others (Rhl, Rh2, Bel) con-
sidered the problem of zero-sum dynamic games with imperfect informa-
tion, and developed solutions for special classes of problems. Starr
and Ho (Stl, St2) developed the theory one step further by considering
non-zero sum games in a dynamic concept; the solution concept which
was used in their work was the Nash equilibrium concept, since the
games considered were games where decisions were made simultaneously
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at each stage. Chen and Cruz (Chl) introduced non-zero sum dynamic
Stackelberg games and defined the open-loop Stackelberg solution
concept. Cruz and Simaan (S1, S2), Basar (Bal) and others have also
studied dynamic Stackelberg games.
The theory of dynamic games with imperfect information was slow
in developing, because even in the simplest cases solutions were
difficult to obtain. Willman (W1) studied the solution of a class of
zero-sum dynamic games with general information structure; however,
most of the work in this area dealt with dynamic games where the
information structure was simplified. On the theoretical side, Wit-
senhausen (Wt2, 3, 4) and Ho (H5) developed a generalization of Kuhn's
theory of extensive games to general stochastic dynamic games without
the finite-decision restriction. This formulation is the basis for
the modern theory of stochastic dynamic games.
The concepts of closed-loop and open-loop solutions were adapted
from modern control theory to dynamic game theory, and relates to
the class of admissible strategies. Simaan and Cruz (SI, S2) intro-
duced the notion of "feedback" equilibria in Stackelberg games. Their
work with these solutions was strictly deterministic. The feedback
solutions discussed by Simaan and Cruz are essentially the signaling-
free equilibria discussed in Section II.3, restricted to deterministic
games. The work of Simaan and Cruz was extended to a class of sto-
chastic games by Castanon and Athans (C1).
The idea of deriving information from other player's decision
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values can be traced back to Thompson (T1) and his work on signaling
strategies. Sandell and Athans (Sal, Sa3) have used this concept in
some non-classical control problems. Aoki (Ao2) discusses a class of
strategies which are essentially signaling-free strategies, while
considering equilibria in Nash games. The restriction of the transfer
of information imposed in the definition of signaling-free strategies
in the previous section has been encountered before (Ao2), but never
formalized in terms of probability spaces and fields as is done in
this dissertation.
II.5 A Game-Theoretic View of Solution Concepts
In this section the various Stackelberg and Nash solution
concepts are described in standard game theoretic terms. Throughout
this section the games are assumed to be deterministic.
Definition II.14. A normal form of a two-player game is a functional
(J, J ) (y , 2 ) assigning a pair of real-valued costs to each pair
of admissible strategies.
Definition II.15. An extensive geometric form for a game is a descrip-
tion with the following properties:
(i) There is a unique starting node x0.
(ii) The game is divided into stages where only one
player acts at each stage.
1 2
(iii) There is unique combination of decisions u , u
which will reach any node.
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(iv) There is a partition of the nodes at each stage, where
all nodes which cannot be distinguished given the
available information belong to the same class.
Definition II.15 is similar to Kuhn's definition of game in
extensive form, although it is considerably simpler because of the
deterministic multistage structure of the formulation in Section II.1.
The concepts of games in normal form and games in extensive geometric
forms will be used for comparing the different solutions discussed in
Sections II.2 and II.3.
The first concept considered is the open-loop Stackelberg
solution whose definition is given by equation (2.13) in Section II.3.
The follower's optimal decisions are functions of the leader's deci-
sions u ; a map u (u ) which assigns a decision sequence u for each
decision sequence u is known as a reactive strategy. A Stackelberg
game expressed in normal form would be expressed in terms of decision
sequences by the leader and reactive strategies for the follower,
assigning a cost vector (determined by using the values as in Section
1 20 1 -loop Stackelberg solution
II.2) to each pair (u ,u (u )). The open-loop Stackelberg solution
is an equilibrium in this form of the game, since equation (2.13)
implies
1 1* 2* 1* 1 1 2* 1
Jl(u l*u (u ))<J u (u )) (2.23)
2 1* 2* 1* 2 1* 20 1*
J2(u * u 2*(u )) < J2(u , u (u20 )) (2.24)
1 20
for all admissible u , u
1* 2* 1*However, not all (u ,u u ( *)) satisfying (2.23) and (2.24) are open-
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loop Stackelberg solutions, because equation (2.24) must hold for all
1 1*
u , not just u . This solution cannot be expressed in terms of a
normal form. The basic reason is that the normal form of a game loses
the concept of when decisions are made with respect to each other,
concentrating instead on assigning payoffs once all decisions are
made. The essential aspect of the open-loop Stackelberg solution
is that the follower makes his choice of strategies after the leader.
This property is lost in the normal form of the game.
The mathematical formulation given in Section II.2 describes
a game in terms of the state of the game. To convert a game in state
form to extensive form, three things are necessary: divide each stage
into several stages so that only one decision maker (including the
random element) acts at each stage; expand the state space so that
two different sequences of decisions will never produce the same state,
and convert the information equations into information sets. The geo-
metric extensive form (K2) was developed for finite games, so in this
discussion the games are also assumed to be finite.
The open-loop Stackelberg solution can be described in terms
of a game whose extensive form has two stages: In the first stage the
leader chooses a decision sequence, and in the second stage the
follower chooses his decision sequence. The reader is referred to (K2)
for a detailed discussion of finite games in extensive from. The
resulting game is one of perfect information, so Theorem 3 of (K2)
establishes the validity of a dynamic programming approach to obtaining
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an equilibrium to the game.
The equilibrium is obtained through dynamic programming as
follows: Each node at stage 2 corresponds to a strategy sequence u
by the leader at stage 1. For each node the follower computes his
optimal decison u . This corresponds to finding the reaction V (u ).
The leader chooses u at stage 1 knowing that the follower will choose
u E V (u). This is the process described by equation (2.13) in
finding the open-loop Stackelberg solution. This solution is easily
identified in a game in extensive geometric form, whereas it wasn't
possible to do so in terms of a game expressed in normal form.
The closed-loop Stackelberg solution has similar properties
to the open-loop Stackelberg solution, since the major difference lies
in the definition of admissible decisions for each player; in the open-
loop case, the players choose decision values, whereas in the closed-
loop case the players choose strategies. As in the open-loop case, the
closed-loop Stackelberg solution is an equilibrium pair of strategies
obtained by dynamic programming in the extensive form of the game.
It is significant that the open and closed-loop Stackelberg
solution concepts are described in terms of an extensive form consisting
of two stages, yet the state representation of the games has N stages.
This reduction arises because the leader chooses all of his strategies
before the follower chooses any of his. Hence, the follower's choices
are based on knowledge of past and future strategies by the leader.
Thus, in choosing strategies, the leader's choices at stage t not only
affect the future evolution of the state through the state equation but
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also the past evolution as it influences the choice of the follower's
strategies at previous stages. This destroys the causal evolution of
equation (2.1), and reduces the problem to a two-stage extensive form.
The open-loop equilibria were defined by equations (2.4) and
(2.5). A game expressed in normal form would assign cost vectors to
1 2
a pair (u , u ) of decision sequences. In terms of a game in normal
form, the open-loop equilibrium is exactly any equilibrium. The game
can be reformulated in extensive form in a manner such that 2N stages
arise. The major feature of this extensive form is that, since the
admissible strategies are constant strategies, the information parti-
tions at each stage are trivial, so that all of the states at a stage
are grouped together. Figure II.1 contains a typical representation
of an open-loop Nash game in extensive form.
Figure II.1.
Unlike the open-loop equilibria, there is a difference between
the Nash and Stackelberg closed-loop equilibria. The major difference
lies in the fact that the follower sees the leader's decision at each
stage before making his own; this is reflected clearly in the set of
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admissible strategies. In terms of games expressed in normal form,
where cost vectors are assigned to each pair of admissible strategy
sequences, both solution concepts are equilibria. Similarly, when
the games are expressed in extensive form, the extensive form consists
of 2N stages; the major difference lies in the information partition,
where the Stackelberg game differs in that the follower now has more
information. The Nash game is a simultaneous game (K2) so that at
stages where the follower acts, the information partition must group
together states where the only difference was the leader's last deci-
sion. In the Stackelberg game, the information partition separates
all of the states.
Since the games are deterministic games, a dynamic programming
approach can be taken to obtaining an equilibrium pair of strategies.
The equilibrium pair of strategies so obtained is the signaling-free
equilibrium. If the game were converted to normal form, the standard
normal form consisting of two players is inadequate in representing
a signaling-free equilibrium. Rather, a normal form corresponding
to 2N players, with costs It, is the adequate normal form for a game
under the signaling-free solution concept. Within this normal form,
the signaling-free equilibrium is an equilibrium between 2N players,
as will be shown in the next section. This is consistent with the
assumption that decisions at each stage are made independently of
other decisions, as opposed to choosing entire decision sequences as in
the closed-loop concepts.
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To summarize, the open-loop and closed-loop Stackelberg solu-
tion concepts are concepts described essentially in terms of a game
with two stages, in extensive form. The open-loop and closed-loop
equilibria are concepts which can be posed naturally in terms of the
normal form of a game, or in a game in extensive form. The signaling-
free equilibria correspond to closed-loop equilibria in deterministic
games, and can be expressed in terms of a game in extensive form
similar to the closed-loop equilibria. However, in terms of a game
in normal form, the signaling-free solution represents an equilibrium
between 2N individual players, as opposed to 2 in the closed-loop
case.
II.6 Relationships between Solution Concepts
In this section several propositions are proven concerning
the solution concepts discussed previously. There is strong emphasis
on the costs achieved under different solution concepts. The results
derived are primarily for deterministic games, although some results
are established in the general case.
Proposition 1: In deterministic games, the leader achieves
a cost under the closed-loop Stackelberg solution concept no higher
than that under the open-loop Stackelberg solution concept if constant
strategies are admissible and when both solutions exist.
1*
Proof: Let J1LS be the leader's optimal expected cost underCLS
1*
the closed-loop concept, JOLS the cost under the open-loop concept.OLS
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10 20 1 1Let u , u be optimal open-loop strategies. For any u EC Ut,
~~2 ~~~~~~~1 t
V (u ) is a set determined by the solution of a deterministic optimal
control problem:
N-1
min 2(u , u) = h2() + E h2(xtt u, Ut)
2 t=0
U
such that
1 2
t+l = ft (xt ut, ut)
where the state xt is known perfectly. From optimal control theory
(Al, Sal),
21 2 2 1 2
min J2(u , u3) = min J (u, y2
2 y2
for all strategies Y :Z UZ , where z2 consists of the value of all
t t
previous decisions u1 (no observations are needed because of the
deterministic framework).
Hence u20 V2 (u 1 0 ). Since by assumption u is an admissible
strategy for player 1, equation (2.14) implies
1* 11 2 1 10 20 1*
CLS min J(y1 2) < J(u u 20) JOS
1
P2 £ V2c (Y1
Proposition 2: In general, the open-loop Stackelberg and
closed-loop Stackelberg solutions yield lower expected costs for the
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leaders than the open-loop Nash equilibria and closed-loop Nash equili-
bria respectively, when they exist.
1*
Proof: Let JCLE be the leader's cost under the closed-loopCLE
le 2e
Nash equilibrium concept, achieved by y e , . Equation (2.7) implies
2e V2 ( ). Equation (2.14) then implies
JCLS min E{J ( , )} < J*
1 CLE
¥2 V2C (1
Similarly, let J1LE be the leader's cost under the open loop equili-OLE
le 2ebrium concept, achieved by u , u . Equation (2.5) implies
U2e E V (ul), so, by equation (2.13)
J = m1 E
iOLS min E{J(u ' u)} < JOLEOLS OLE
1
u
u2 V1 (u)
Proposition 3: In deterministic Nash and Stackelberg games,
every open-loop equilibrium is also a closed-loop equilibrium if con-
stant strategies are admissible.
Proof: Sandell (Sa2) proved this proposition for Nash games.
The proof for Stackelberg games follows his proof. Let (u le, u e )
le vlc2e
be an open-loop equilibrium pair. From Proposition 1, u e V (u )
and u e V (u le) because of the equivalence of open- and closed-loop
solutions in control theory for deterministic games. Thus, by
definition of V and V , (u , u ) satisfy equations (2.15) and
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le 2e(2.16), since u and-u are admissible strategies.
The implications of Proposition 3 are that, in deterministic
games, whenever a closed-loop equilibrium is sought, it is not nec-
essary to solve the functional minimization problems indicated in
equations (2.15) and (2.16). Rather, the simpler problem of finding
an open-loop equilibrium, when it exists, provides a feasible solution
to the problem of finding a closed-loop equilibrium. The next pro-
position establishes another equivalence which provides an alternate
method of finding closed-loop equilibria.
Proposition 4: The signaling-free equilibria in Nash and
Stackelberg games are closed-loop equilibria in deterministic games.
Proof: In deterministic games, the stochastic elements are
trivial. Equivalently, F in (Q, F , P ) is F { Q}. Hence,
admissible yt for both the closed-loop and feedback equilibria depend
only on the past decisions { 0, .. t 1 and the a priori parameters
of the game. Thus, the sets of admissible strategies are the same.
Now, consider a Nash game. Equation (2.9) implies
"i 1 2N Z i 1 2
I N-1 ( N-l' N-' - J (N-l ' N 1 N-l' NN-) i N
and recursively, since the random elements are deterministic,
^i 1 2 i ii 2 i iIt(, it, t) = Y Yt) for all t. So, the costs I0 and J0 are
!It ' ~' st = Jt
the same in the Nash deterministic game. Then, from equations (2.11)
and (2.12) for t = 0, any one equilibrium pair le, satisfies
(2.6) and (2.7), hence it is a closed-loop equilibrium.
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The proof for Stackelberg games is identical.
For finite-state, finite decision games expressed in Kuhn's
(K2) extensive form, Kuhn (K2) has established a general result which
gives conditions as to when the problem of finding closed-loop
equilibria can be approached using a dynamic programming decomposi-
tion. Kuhn's results are not restricted to deterministic games; in
Chapter IV the equivalence of closed-loop and signaling-free equili-
bria in stochastic games is discussed.
Proposition 4 does not hold in general games. The reason for
this is that signaling-free equilibria are equilibria between 2N inde-
pendent players; the causality condition that orders the decision-
making process also suggests that each player needs to make assump-
tions of optimal play only from the players that act after him. This
reduces the assumptions implicit in the solution concept, and allows
for suboptimal strategies by the preceding players. However, in the
closed-loop equilibria it is assumed that all strategies at all
stages arise out of optimal play. Thus, it is significant that in
deterministic games signaling-free equilibria are also closed-loop
equilibria. This point will be discussed further for stochastic
games in Chapters IV and V.
CHAPTER III
In this chapter several examples are introduced to clarify
the concepts and results presented in the previous chapter. The
examples presented consist of deterministic games, expressed in terms
of the mathematical formulation of Chapter II. Some interesting
results in non-zero sum dynamic games (Ba3) are discussed in the
context of these examples. Section 1 deals with a finite-state,
finite-decision game. The rest of the chapter deals with infinite
state and decision spaces.
III.1. A Finite-State, Finite-Decision Game
Within the mathematical framework of Section II.1, define
1 1 2 2
U U = U = U = {O, 1} as the sets of admissible decision by
1 2 1 2
players 1 and 2 at stages 1 and 2 respectively. The sets of possible
states xt are x1 = {O}, x2 = x3 = {O, 1}. This game is a determin-
istic game, so the stochastic elements in equations (2.1) and (2.2)
are trivial. Define the state evolution equation as
xt+ = (x + u + u2) mod 2 (3.1)
The costs associated with player 1 can be expressed functionally as:
1 1 2 1hl(X, u ) = (2 u l + 4u ) mod 3 + u
hl(x, u u) = x + u + u (3.2)
h (x) = x
3
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Player 2's costs are given by
2 1 2 1 u2
h (x, u , u = (u + 4u ) mod 3
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 x (33)
h (x, u, u ) = 2 + u + ul(1-u2 ) + u (1-u) (-1)xh2,
h3(x) = 1
The expressions for the total cost are the same as equation (2.3);
that is,
i i i 1 2 i 1 2 (34)J = h3 (x3) + h2(x 2, u2) + hl(xl, u, (3 4)
The game described so far can be represented in terms of a
state-transition map as in Figure III.1, where on each directed path,
the numbers in parenthesis denote the values of the decision (u , u2 )
originating that transition, and the bracketed numbers the costs
[h , h 2 ] associated with that transition.
Figure III.1 contains a summary of the physical rules governing
the play of the game. Additional assumptions concerning the order of
play at each stage, and the approach towards optimality which each
player takes need to be specified; these additional rules will be
given by the various solution concepts discussed in Chapter II.
Eliminating the state transitions, a table can be constructed
which assigns a pair ( , J2) of costs to each admissible decision
1 1 2 2 11
sequence (u1l, u2, 1 u2, ). Identifying the rows as ulu2, the columns
2 2
as U1U 2, this table is shown in Table 111.2.
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22
UlU2
1 1
U1U2 00 01 10 11
00 (2,4) (4,5) (4,4) (4,3)
01 (4,6) (4,5) (4,6) (6,5)
10 (3,5) (3,4) (1,5) (3,6)
11 (3,7) (5,6) (3,7) (3,6)
Table III.2
An open-loop Nash equilibrium pair is described in Section II.2
by equations (2.4) and (2.5). Table III.2 is the normal form of the
game for the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept (since the strategies
are constant strategies). It is easy to verify by inspection that
only two entries are open-loop Nash equilibria: The pair of decision
sequences (10, 01) with associated costs (3,4), and the pair (11, 11)
with associated costs (3,6).
Table III.2 can also be used in obtaining the solution under the
open-loop Stackelberg concept described in Section II.3. Under this
concept, with player 1 as leader, player 1 chooses a row first, then
player 2 chooses a column. The rational reaction set of player 2 is
then the entry in each row with the minimal second element. A quick
inspection of Table III.2 yields one open-loop Stackelberg solution,
satisfying equation (2.13): the pair (10, 01) with associated costs
(3,4). As expected from Proposition 2 in Section II.6, the leader's
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cost 3 is no greater than the cost achieved under either of the open-
loop Nash equilibria. It is important to note that Table III.2 is not
the normal form of the Stackelberg game; additional rules, such as the
order of choices, had to be specified in defining the open-loop
Stackelbeyg solution. As indicated in Section II.5, the normal form
for the game would be in terms of reactive strategies for player 2.
The optimal reactive strategy for player 2 corresponds to his rational
reaction set, and can be expressed as:
2 2
u (00) = 11; u (01) = 01
(3.5)2 2
u (10) = 01; u (11) = 11
Closed-loop and signaling-free equilibria are equilibria in
terms of admissible strategies, which have yet to be defined. The sets
of admissible strategies for the Nash game are
r i = {all deterministic maps from Xt + Ut } (3.6)t t
It is readily seen that each player has four admissible strategies at
stage 2. Identify these four strategies as a,b,c,d where
a(O) = 0, a(l) = 0
b(O) = 0, b(l) = 1 (3.7)
c(O) = 1; c(1) = 0
d(O) = 1; d(l) = 1
At stage 1, since xl = O, there are only two strategies; denote them
by their value 0 or 1. Using this terminology, the rational reaction
sets Vc can be obtained to each strategy sequence used by a player.
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The reaction sets are defined by (in the case of player 2),
v2c 1 = 20 r2 2 2 1 201 21 (Y
21 2 2 2 2
< J2(1 ,2) for r x r2} (3.8)
Calculating Vic is a simple minimization and can be done using
Table III.2. Table III.3 describes the costs associated with each pair
of strategy sequences.
Oa Ob Oc Od la lb lc ld
Oa (2,4) (2,4) (4,5) (4,5) (4,4) (4,3) (4,4) (4,3)
0b (2,4) (2,4) (4,5) (4,5) (4,6) (6,5) (4,6) (6,5)
Oc (4,6) (4,6) (4,5) (4,6) (4,4) (4,3) (4,4) (4,3)
Od (4,6) (4,6) (4,5) (4,6) (4,6) (6,5) (4,6) (6,5)
la (3,5) (3,4) (3,5) (3,4) (1,5) (1,5) (3,6) (3,6)
lb (3,7) (5,6) (3,7) (5,6) (1,5) (1,5) (3,6) (3,6)
ic (3,5) (3,4) (3,5) (3,4) (3,7) (3,7) (3,6) (3,6)
ld (3,7) (5,6) (3,7) (5,6) (3,7) (3,7) (3,6) (3,6)
Table III.3
Using Table III.3, the rational reactions of each player can be
computed. These are summarized in Table III.4.
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Player 2's Player l's
V2 c (Oa) = {ld,lb} Vlc (O a) = {Oa,Ob}
(Ob) = {Oa,Ob} (Ob) = {Oa,Ob}
(Oc) = {lb,ld} (Oc) = {la,lb,lc,ld}
(Od) = {Oc,Od,lb,ld} (Od) = {la,lc}
(la) = {Ob,Od} (la) = {la,lb}
(lb) = {lb,la} (lb) = {la,lb}
(lc) = {Ob,Od} (Ic) = {la,lb,lc,ld}
(ld) = {Ob,Od,lc,ld} (id) = {la,lb,lc,ld}
Table III.4 Rational Reactions sets
The closed-loop Nash equilibria are pairs of admissible strate-
gies ( 1N , ) such that 1N V ( V2N ), as canbe seen
from equations (2.6) and (2.7) and the definition of the reaction
sets. Searching through Table III.4 several equilibria are found.
These are listed in Table III.5.
Equilibrium pairs Costs
(Ob,Oa) , (Ob,Ob) (2,4)
(la,Od), (lc,Od) (3,4)
(lb,la), (lb,lb) (1,5)
(ld,lc), (ld,ld) (3,6)
Table III.5 List of closed-loop equilibria
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As expected from Proposition 3 of Section II.6, the open-loop
Nash equilibria (la,Od) and (ld,ld) are also closed-loop equilibria.
Note the relative abundance of closed-loop equilibria; unless there is
a previous agreement among the players as to which equilibrium is pre-
ferable, this solution concept is not uniquely defined even in this
simple game. This is part of the motivation for the introduction of
the third class of Nash equilibria in dynamic games, the signaling-
free equilibria.
The signaling-free Nash equilibria can be obtained through
backwards induction. Assume that the state at stage -two is x2 = 0,
and consider the remaining game with costs J starting at x O. This2 2
game is shown in Figure III.6,
(0,0) [0,2] [0
2
The Nash equilibrium solution for this truncated game is found
1 2by inspection to be u = 0, u = 0 with optimal costs (0,3). Similarly,2 2
-55-
1 2
for x2 = 1, the optimal equilibrium decision are u2 = 0, u1 = 1 with
costs [2,2]. Thus, at stage 2, the signaling-free Nash equilibrium
strategies are Y (x) = a, Y2 (x) = b. Denote the costs-to-go at
1 2
state x by the functions (I , I2). Then, the associated costs-to-go
1 2 1 2
are: (I2 , I )(0) = (0,3) and (I2 I2)(1) = (2,2).
The optimal strategies for stage 1 can now be determined, since
since any combination of decisions at the first stage results in a
transition to a state at the second stage; since the optimal strategies
from stage 2 on are known, a complete cost can be associated with
decisions at stage 1. The game at stage 1 can thus be reduced to the
form expressed in Figure III.7.
(0,0) [2,1] 1 2
x=O [I2, I2] = [0,3]
1 2
\l (1,0)[I2, 12] = [2,2]
Figure III.7 Reduced game at stage 1
The reduced game of Figure III.7 has no equilibrium in terms of
pure strategies. Although an equilibrium in terms of mixed strategies
is guaranteed by Nash's extension of the minmax theorem (N1,N2), it is
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beyond the scope of this work as mixed strategies are not admissible
strategies. Nevertheless, the fact that no signaling-free Nash
equilibria exist does not imply that other closed-loop equilibria
exist, as evidenced by Table III.5. Throughout a large section of
the dynamic game literature, the search for closed-loop equilibria
is performed by finding signaling-free equilibria recursively, over-
looking the fact that these two solution concepts are not equivalent.
Only in the special case of deterministic games and other cases dis-
cussed in Chapter IV can closed-loop equilibria be found in recursive
fashion.
The closed-loop Stackelberg solution can be determined using
Table III.4, since the follower is constrained to choose strategies
in his rational reaction set v2c( 1). Looking through the potential
1 2
choices for 1 and y , the optimal closed-loop Stackelberg solution
pairs are (lb,lb) and (lb,la), both resulting in a cost vector of
(1,5). This is the entry in Table III.3 with the lowest cost for
the leader, underlying the leader's dominance under this solution
concept.
The last two solution concepts that will be discussed in the
context of this example are the closed-loop and the signaling-free
Stackelberg equilibria. The difference between these two concepts
and the Nash concepts previously discussed is the set of the follower's
2 2
admissible strategies. For the Stackelberg concepts, rl and r2
are defined as:
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r2 = 2{I2 1 2
F1 ~ = ¥y2 1:Xl x U11 (3.8)
r2= { 2 X2 xU1 +U2
2 222 2 2
2 2
It is easy to see r1 has four elements and r2 has 16 elements.1 2
Denote the four elements of r2 as a, b, c, and d, defined previously
in equation (3.7), and the elements of r2 by four binary numbers repre-
2 1
senting assignments of u2 to elements of X2 x U2. For example the
strategy 0100 is the map Y2 ( u2) described as:
x 2 u2
00 -0
0 1 + 1
0100 - (3.9)
10 +0
1 1 +0
With this nomenclature, a table similar to Table III.4 can
be obtained listing the rational reaction sets of each player. Table
III.8 lists the possible closed-loop Stackelberg equilibria:
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1 2
1 2 Costs
Ob a,0000 through a0111 (2,4)
la,lc a1010-allll (3,4)
cO10 ,c0011
cOll 0,c011
cl010, c1011
clllO,cllll
lb b0000-bO111 (1,5)
d0000-d0111
ld bllOO + bllll
dl100 + dllll
Table III.8 Closed-loop Stackelberg equilibria
Note the presence of the open-loop equilibria (la,allll) and
(ld,dllll) in Table III.8, as implied by Proposition 3 of Section II.6.
As in the closed-loop Nash solution concept, the abundance of closed-
loop equilibria that are not cost equivalent and the redundancy of a
lot of the strategies present make this solution concept undesirable
for dynamic games.
The signaling-free equilibria can be found recursively
in a fashion similar to the signaling-free Nash equilibria. The
difference between these two concepts is the added assumption in the
Stackelberg solution concept that the leader makes his decision known
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to the follower at each stage before the follower chooses his decision.
Thus, using backwards induction, the optimal equilibrium strategies
can be defined at stage 2 by
2* 1 ( 2 1 2 2 1 
y2 (x2, u2) = argmin (h2(x u2, u 2) + h3(f2(x2, u2 , u2
(3.10)
1* 2* 1*
Similar equations can be written for y2 2 y1 , and y1 in
sequential order. Solution of these equations yields a unique
signaling-free Stackelberg equilibrium pair:
1* 2*
y = la, y = c0011, with costs (3,4) (3.11)
As indicated by Proposition 4 of Section II.6, this equilibrium is
also a closed loop equilibrium, shown in Table III.8.
Thus far, the solution concepts described in Chapter II have
been applied to a simple finite example while verifying that the
results in Section II.6 hold. Even in this simple multi-stage game,
the inadequacy of some solution concepts is highlighted. In particular,
the closed-loop equilibria are so numerous and have different asso-
ciated costs that additional restrictions are needed in order to
specify a unique solution. In deterministic games, Proposition 4
of Section II.6 establishes the signaling-free equilibria as closed-
loop equilibria, thus providing an example of such additional restric-
tions. In the next sections, these solution concepts are used in
some continuous games.
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III.2 A Continuous State and Decision Multi-Stage Game
Consider the multi-stage game whose evolution equation is given
as
x1 = 1 + 0+ VO (3.12)
X2 = 1 + u1 Xi £ R
The cost functions for player l(u) and player 2(v) are:
J] = (x2) + (u0) + (Ul) (3.13)
J2 = (x 2) + 1/2(u)2 + (v 2
The closed-loop Nash equilibria of this game have been studied by
Tamer Basar (Ba3, Ba4). He deals with a slightly more general version
of this game, which he uses in showing the non-uniqueness of closed-loop
Nash equilibria; in particular, he shows the existence of nonlinear
equilibrium strategies in this game, a linear, quadratic cost problem.
In order to exhibit this multiplicity of equilibria, he increases the
set of admissible strategies to include "memory-dependent" strategies;
mathematically, the sets of admissible strategies considered are
1 = y1 1 2 22r 0 = {¥ l¥0:x0 + R} r0 = { Y0 : X0 + R}
r 1 {Y 1 x1 x U XX 1 R Y1 is continuouslyF 1 110 0 0 1 1
differentiable}
The memory-dependent aspect of the strategies includes a
certain redundancy which enables Basar to find strategies which are
equal in value but different in representation. Although his conclu-
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sions that the closed-loop equilibrium concept in Nash games is not
an adequate solution concept in this example are similar to those
discussed in Section III.1, it is not necessary to deal with nonlinear
strategies. It is shown below that even restricting to linear strate-
gies does not achieve uniqueness of the closed-loop equilibria.
Let the set of admissible strategies r1 be the set of all
Borel measurable maps from the reals into the reals. The state space
1 1 2X 0 contains only one element, X0 = 1, X 1= U = U = = R. The
claim is that Nash equilibrium strategies of the form uO = b,
u1 = axl + c and v0 = d exist for several choices of a, b, c, d.
These strategies are neither nonlinear nor memory-dependent. In par-
1 4
ticular, Basar exhibits the strategy u1 = - 2 x1 , u0 = - and
O = - 1 which is the signaling-free Nash strategy for this game with
1* 2*
costs J = .2133, J .1467.
In particular, let a = c. The rational reaction set of
player 2 is V 2c(b, a(x1 + 1)), determined as
2c(b, ax + a) = v<J 2 (b, ax1 + a) { J 2(b , ax + a; + a; v)1 0~b. "1+ a)=ivO~lJ2~ ba(b a 0 1+ v
¥ vO E R} (3.14)
2 2 2 12
Now, J (b,(axl + a); vO) = (x2) + v + - u1
2 2 I +1 2
= (x + ax + a) + v 2+1(ax 1 + a)1 1 0 2 1 a
= {(l+vo+b)(l+a) + al ++ 2 +1 a (2+vo+b)
This expression has a unique minimum in terms of v0, given as the
solution of
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2(1 + a)((1 + v + b)(1 + a) + a) + 2v0 + a (2 + v 0 + b) = O0
(3.15)
It is easy to inspect that, given constants a and b, (3.15)
implies v0 is uniquely defined. The rational reaction set V C(v0)
can be similarly computed.
1 1 1 2
Jl(u 0 r y1 ; V0) = (1 + U + V +  1(l + u + V ))
2 1 2
+ u0 + (Y1 (l + uO + v0 )) (3.16)
The minimization of (3.16) is a classical optimal control
problem and can be obtained using dynamic programming. This procedure
is:
min J (u0, 1 v) = min min J1(u0, y1; v0 )}
uO1 0 1 1
inm J (u 1 x; vO)
Since J1 ( 1 v0) is minimized by 1 Xll 2 21 2
=min {-(1 + U + v) 2 + u2 }2 0 0 0
u0
The minimizing value of u0 is - - (1 + v ). Furthermore, (3.16) is
1 1 1
also minimized by Y1 = - -(1 + vO) = Xl or any other strategy whichalso minimized by 1
has this value along the optimal trajectory. In particular,
1 (v0+l) 1
1 5+2v (xl + 1) is a strategy with the representation y1 =
a(xl + 1) which minimizes (3.16) and thus belongs to V l(v). The
closed-loop equilibrium is then defined by:
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uO = - (1 + vo) = b (3.17)
1 (v0+1)
1 -5+2v 1) (xl + 1) = a 3
.
18)
2(1 + a){(l + v 0+ b)(1 + a) + a} + 2v 0 + a( 2 + v 0 + b)= 0
(3.19)
Substitute (3.17) and (3.18) into (3.19) to get
2(vO +4) 2(5+2v (3(v0+l)(v 0+4)-(v 0+l)) + 2v0
(5+2v0)
(v + 1)2
+ - 2 + 2(vo + 1)) = (3.20)
(5+2v0
Simplifying,
3(2v 0 + 5) {2(v + 4)(v + 1) + 6(v)(2v + 5) + (v + 1)2 = 0
Expand the inner expression in powers of v0
15 v2 + 42v0 + 9 = 0 (3.21)
Equation (3.21) has two real solutions, vo = -.2338066 and
vO = -2.5662, each of which in combination with (3.17) and (3.18)
would yield equilibrium strategies. Consider only the equilibrium
where vo = -.2338066. The corresponding values of u0 and a are
uO = -.2553968 and a = -.169048. The trajectory produced by these
decision is x0 = 1, x1 = .510794, and x2 = .255397. Therefore, the
costs associated with this equilibrium are
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la 2 2 2
J = UO + u + x2 = .19568
(3.22)
2a 2 12 2J v0 + 1u + x2 .152507
In this new equilibrium, player 1 has reduced his cost, and player 2
has suffered an increase in cost over the signaling-free Nash equili-
1* 2*
brium costs J , J . Another equilibrium for this game is obtained
through the open-loop Nash equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 3 of
Section II.6. The open-loop Nash equilibrium values are: u0 = u1 =
vO = -.25, resulting in the trajectory xO = 1, xl = .5, x2 = .25 and
0 0
costs J = .1875, J2 = .15625 which again exhibit the behavior that
the first player reduces his cost, player 2 increases his cost over
the signaling-free equilibrium's costs.
The multiplicity of equilibria was observed by Basar (Ba3)
while examining nonlinear equilibria. The conclusions were that addi-
tional rules had to be specified in order to define a solution. The
signaling-free equilibria include such a set of additional rules. The
behavior of the costs for the three equilibria found earlier can be
explained in terms of the basic assumptions behind each equilibrium
pair. In all three equilibria, it is optimal to have the value of the
decision ul equal to - 'x1. This is easily verified looking at the
various equilibria. What differs is the representation given to this
value. For signaling-free equilibria, it is represented as ul --Xl,
while in the others as u1 = a(x1 + 1) and u1 = c. The interpretation
of these three representations is crucial in understanding the behavior
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of the costs: the representation u1 = - x1 implies no assumptions
at all about the previous decisions made in the game. It simply states
that, no matter what is done previously, the decision ul will be made
after seeing what xl is. The point is that this representation does
not assume any type of optimal decision previously in order to be
optimal.
In contrast, the other two representations assume certain
optimal decisions u0 and v0 in order for them to have the value
u1 = - x1. The open-loop Nash equilibrium carries the strongest
assumptions of any of the three, as it assumes exact values of u0 and
v for u to be - Thus, the last two representations of ul
o 1 2l
involve assumptions with respect to u0 and v0; limiting the classes
of admissible strategies a priori for y1 to constant strategies, or
as a(xl + 1), affects the choice of v0; this corresponds to allowing
player 1 to make a decision (restricting his class of strategies)
prior to player 2's choices. The reduction in cost is achieved because
the restricted class of strategies is still able to produce the same
decisions as were used in the unrestricted equilibrium solutions, and
because player 2 accepts player l's prior commitment to this class of
strategies so his decision is influenced by the change in representa-
tion.
The behavior of the costs is similar to that exhibited in the
closed-loop Stackelberg solution concept. The dominance of the leader
enables him to specify the choices of his future strategies exactly
before the follower can choose his present strategies. Thus, the
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leader influences the follower's choice through the future strategies,
and thus achieves a reduced cost compared to equilibrium concepts.
Since player 1 is the only decision maker in stage 2 of this game,
the restriction to a given class of strategies exerts a similar influ-
ence on the follower's choice in the equilibria discussed earlier, and
thus achieves a reduction in the leader's cost similar to that indi-
cated by Proposition 2 of Section II.6.
This phenomenon is exhibited best considering memory-dependent
strategies, as Basar did. The non-linear equilibria found in (Ba3) are
of the form
1 2 2
u = - + K(Xl (1 + u0 + v (3.23)
where u0 and v0 are constants equal in value to the equilibrium values
of u0, v0 and K is a constant. In the equilibrium trajectory,
U1 = --X 1 as expected. However, restricting the admissible strategies
to those in (3.23) affects the choices of u0 and v0 as for u1 to be in
equlibrium, u0 and v0 must take on the values u0, v0. The strategy
in (3.23) poses a "threat" to player 2; his choice is influenced by the
knowledge that in the future he is expected to play uO, vO. The
clearest example of a threat would be restricting u1 to strategies of
the form
u = + K(v c) (3.24)
where K is very large and co is a constant. As K increases beyond
bounds, the equilibrium value of v0 will approach c0.
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1
Player l's reduction of cost is a byproduct of his choice of y
prior to the choice of vo, thus exerting influence on player 2's
choice. The ambiguity in the closed-loop Nash equilibrium concept
enables player 1 to choose Y1 in this fashion. More appropriate is
the closed-loop Stackelberg solution to the game, which specifies that
this choice is made before vo is chosen.
For this game, the closed-loop Stackelberg solution is obtained
as follows:
Restrict rl to be r {y1(xl) = axl s a 6 R}1 1 1 1
Then, the follower's reaction set to strategies (uO, ax1) is given by
V2C = {v*jJ 2 (u , ax ; v*) < j2(u , ax ; v ) - v 6 RI
0 0 I' 0 -- '
Now, J (u0, axl; v0) = vO + ((l+a) + a2 ) (1 + + v)o2 0 0
Then, v* is given by the solution of
2 1 2
2v* + 2((1 + a) + 1 a)(1 + u +v) =O.0 2 0 0
Thus,
(2a + (l+a) 2
= _ (1 + u 0 )0O 1 2 2 (3.25)(1 + Wa + (l+a))
and
1 (1 + u 0 )
X= 1+ u + V*0 12 2 
(1 0 + a + (l+a) )
It is easy to see from (3.25) that, even when yl is restricted to linear
strategies, the leader can achieve as low a cost as he desires by
letting u0 = 0 and a be very large. As a + -, xl + 0 and axl + 0 also.
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Thus,
U+x2+21 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
CLS 2 UlJCLS O 2 1 as a 
The interpretation of this behavior is as follows: the leader
threatens to increase the state x1 to (l+a)x0 ; when a is very large,
the follower's cost is increased greatly. Thus, as a increases, the
follower will try to make xl as small as possible in lieu of the
leader's threat. In making this threat, the leader achieves a reduc-
tion in cost similar to that seen previously in the Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, this property is preserved even if player 2 was able to
make decisions in stage 2, as long as player 1 is able to choose his
strategy at stage 2 before player 2 chooses his strategy at stage 1.
The open-loop Stackelberg solution concept also assumes domin-
ance by the leader, but the admissible strategies are restricted to
constant strategies, so that the possible threats are limited. The
open-loop Stackelberg solution in this example is found as follows:
The follower's reaction set V 2(u0, u1) is found by minimizing
(u, u, = u + Vo2 + (1 + u + v + u 2
Thus,
V2u 0 , u1) = v0 E RIv 0 (1 + u + u 1) }  0 2 0 1
Then, from equation (2.13),
(uO, u*) = argmin J (uO,ul; v0) =
O 1 2
Vo E V (u U 1)
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= argmin {u2 + u2 + (1 + u + u1) 4}
u0ou 1
Differentiating,
2u + (u 0+ u 1 + 1) = 0
2u1 + 2 (1 + uO + u1) = 0
1 1
Therefore u =u = - and v = -0 1 6 0 3-
1* 2k*
The optimal costs are JOS = .16667, J = .25. Again, the
leader's dominance is seen in the reduction of the leader's cost JOLS
relative to the open-loop equilibrium solutions found earlier. In
the next section an example with imperfect information is discussed to
see how the dominance implied in some of these solution concepts is
affected by uncertainties in the system.
III.3 A Game with Uncertainties
Consider the game whose evolution equation is given by
1 = X0 + u0 + v0 + 26)(3.26)
x2 = X1 + U1
where e0 is a zero-mean random variable with variance C. The costs
associated with this game are:
J1 = E {x2 + u2 + u2}
0=E + 2 0 1
2 2 2 1 2
J = Ee{x + v + u1}
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The set of admissible strategies r1 is the set of all Borel measurable
functions yl(x1). That is, the value of xl is known to player 1 at
stage 1, but not at the beginning of the game. Signaling-free Stackel-
berg equilibria for this game can be obtained as:
y1 (x1 ) = argmin {E(x2 + u2) Xl }
1 1
Y1 C r1
argmin {x + 2xu + u + u21= 1 x
U1
2* 2 2 1y20 (XO,'UO)= argmin E{(x22 + vO + 2ul~ulu= _ 2 Xl }0 (x0 Iu0) = argmin E{(x + 2 + l 2 °0 0 2 0 lUl'U, 2
v0
= argmin E{v 2 + -(x + u0 + v0 + 0) }
V0
2 3 2 3
=argmin {v + -(xO + uO + v0) + E -}
v0
- 1 (x + uO)
~1'" ~2 2 2 I1 3 +(xO) = argmin {E(x2 + u + u =- 1' 0 = (x0 u)}
18 2 2
argmin E{1(1(x 0+ u0 ) + 0 ) +u)}
u0
1 32 2 2
=argmin {-+21 £ ( + 1(x + u) u}
u0
= -.20915 x0
Let xO = 1 as in the previous section. Then
u0 = -.20915
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v0 3 (1 + uO) = -. 215686
1xi = 1 + U* v* + 80 = .5752 + e0
2 1= -Ul = .287582 + 8O/2
1* S 2* 3
with costs J = .20915 + , J = .17058 + e £.
In finding other closed-loop equilibria the approach of the
previous section cannot be used, since the uncertainty in 0 makes the
representation u1 = 1 unique. Basar (Ba4) points out that uncer-
tainties in the system eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria ex-
hibited in the previous section for the Nash game. For instance, the
open-loop Nash equilibrium is no longer a closed-loop equilibrium, as
the optimal reaction set V lc(.25) does not include the strategy
1
u 0= .25, u1 = .25 because the strategy u0 = .25, u = achieves
a lower value for the leader's cost.
The uniqueness of representation in yl eliminates the possi-
bility of influence introduced through the different representations
discussed in the previous section. However, the dominance of the
closed-loop Stackelberg solution concept is still present, although
somewhat affected, as seen below. As before, the leader's strategy set
1 1 1 2C
is r1 = {y11ly 7 x1 ) = axl}. The follower's reaction set V (u0, ax1 )
is determined by v0(uO, ax1) c v2C(u0, axl), where
1 1 2 l2 u12
vO( u 0, ax 1) = argmin E{x 2 + vO + u1 uO,u l = ax } =
v
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= argmin E{(l+a) 2x + 1 a 2x + v2 }
v
2
2 a 2
= argmin {(2-+ (l+a)2)(x 0 + u 0 + v0)
+ ((l+a) + 2a)£ + vO}2 0
(a2- + (l+a)2)
a 22 (X+ + U(-)-
1 + - + (l+a)
Thus,
mm EC~l~a)~22 22
min J (u0,axl; v) = min E{(l+a) x1 + a x
1 a,uOa ,u0
Uo '¥1
vO £ V2C(uO0 ax)
+ U2 IVO V2 C(u0 ,ax1 ) + ui2 lv0 va 2 2
((l+a)2+a )(x +u)2
=min 0 -0 2
a,u0 ((l+a)2 + 2 + 1)2
2 2·I (3.27)
+ (1+a)2£ + a2E} (3.27)
The difference between this minimization and that of Section
III.2 is the presence of the term (l+a) C + a 2 which goes to - as
a gets large, so that an unbounded solution does not exist. Differen-
tiating (3.27) with respect to u0, and equating to 0,
2 2
(l+a) + a _ (x + u*) + u* = 0 (3.28)
2 a 2
((l+a) + + 1)
2
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Thus,
(a2 + (l+a) ) x0
uO0~~ 2'U0 2  2 2 2
((l+a) + +) ++ 1) +a)
Substituting into (3.27) gives
2 2 2 a 22 2 2 2
jl m1* in ((l+a) + ((l+a) + 1)2 (a (1+a)
CLS = m 2 2 2(a+) 2
(((l+a )2 + a + (a+l)
2 2)
+ (a + (l+a) 2)E
= min I a (a+l) 2 2 (a+l)2s}
2a ((l+a)2 + a2-+ 1) + a + (a+l)(
The minimizing value of a is a solution of
32 2[(? +2a+2) 2+2a2 +2a+11(4a+2)-(2a +2a+l)((3a2+4a+4)(3a+2)+(4a+2))
32 2 2 2((r +2a+2) +(2a2+2a+l))
+ (4a+2)£ = 0
This expression reduces to:
(-a) (a2 + 2a + 2)(6a2 + 9a + 2)
+ (4a + 2)£ = O (3.29)
((-a + 2a + 2) + (2a + 2a + 1))
If s = 0, then (3.29) reduces to a quintic polynomial with three real
roots, none of which is the true minimum as all of them yield costs of
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order 1. Assuming 0 < E << 1, (3.29) yields a 9th order polynomial.
Treating this as a singular perturbation problem and trying to find
the roots of this polynomial in terms of e, the five original roots
are changed little, since C << 1. The other four roots are of large
magnitude. Expanding (3.29),
-a(22 + 2a + 2)(6a + 9a + 2)
+ C(4a + 2)((-a + 2a + 1) + 2a + 2a + 1) =0 (3.30)
Since lal >> 1, (3.30) can be approximated as
5 81 9
-9a + 4 - a = 0 (3.31)16 1 1
4 4 2 2 -4
so, Ca - Thus, a= . C >> 1.
This is only a zeroth order approximation, but sufficient for purposes
of illustration. The cost achieved under these values of a is approxi-
mately
1
4 -2 1 1 1
1* 3 2 42 42 42
CLS 1 3 3 3
1 4 -2
+ E
C 3
A more detailed expansion of this cost yields a slight differ-
ence for the two possible signs of a; the negative sign yields a
slightly lower cost. This expansion is not shown as it is not relevant
to the question at hand. The important point is that, even in the
presence of uncertainty, the leader was able to exercise a threat on the
follower, but tempered by the parameters of the uncertainty. When no
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noise was present the leader was able to reduce his cost to 0 by
threatening to increase the follower's cost without bounds. In the
presence of even a minimal uncertainty, the leader can only threaten
up to a point, after which it is not advantageous for him to do so.
This is in contrast with the other types of threats discussed in the
previous section, which were completely eliminated by the uncertainty
in the system. Table III.9 summarizes the results of Sections III.2
and III.3.
III.4 Discussion
The example presented in this chapter were chosen to illustrate
the various solution concepts discussed in the previous chapter, and to
highlight several properties of some solution concepts. These examples
include enough sophistication to cover most of the relevant cases. In
general the major point stressed is the ambiguity of closed-loop equili-
brium concepts when applied to dynamic deterministic games. As indi-
cated in Chapter 2, these concepts are expressed in terms of games in
normal form, which do not specify the order in which strategies are
chosen, thus enabling one player by restricting his strategy choice, to
exercise a threat over his opponent.
The cause of this ambiguity is the prior commitment of the
players to their strategies. That is, when player 1 announces that he
will restrict his choice at stage 1 a priori, will he still restrict
his choice at stage 1 once he observes that, given what the players did
-76-
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at stage 0, this strategy restriction is no longer optimal? The
closed-loop equilibria assume that this prior commitment is there, as
do the open- and closed-loop Stackelberg solutions. The signaling-free
equilibria, on the other hand, do not assume prior commitment of any
players to their strategies. The ultimate version of this effect is
for a player to choose his strategy sequence completely before the
other player has chosen his; this corresponds to the dominant solution
in the closed-loop Stackelberg concept. Aumann and Maschler (Au2),
Ho (H4) have discussed the inadequacies of the normal form of the game
in representing dynamic games. These ambiguities indicate that solution
concepts other than closed-loop equilibria, such as the signaling-free
equilibria, are more appropriate. Furthermore, the examples show how
even equilibrium solutions can have dominance properties in determinis-
tic games. However, this dominance is eliminated in non-deterministic
games as seen in the example of the previous section.
The dominance exhibited by the closed-loop Stackelberg solution
concept is not eliminated by uncertainties in the system. The leader's
dominance in deterministic games is complete, achieving the lowest
possible cost as if both players were minimizing the leader's cost.
However, in nondeterministic games, this dominance is weakened because
of the uncertainties in the game, as seen in the previous section.
In nondeterministic games, the closed-loop equilibrium solution
concept is less ambiguous than in deterministic games. However, the
introduction of uncertainty brings up the notion of information and
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communication, problems which have not been considered yet. The next
chapter will deal with closed-loop and signaling-free equilibria in
non-deterministic games.
CHAPTER IV
IV.1 Introduction
Although the mathematical framework discussed in Chapter II
incorporated the concept of uncertainty and information, most of the
results presented in Chapters II and III have been restricted to
deterministic games. In this chapter the closed-loop equilibrium and
the signaling-free equilibrium concepts are applied to non-determinis-
tic Stackelberg games. Several important differences between these
concepts are highlighted by the stochastic nature of the games. Most
of the work in the earlier sections of this chapter is based on Hans
Witsenhausen's work (Wt2, 3, 4) on nonclassical control theory.
IV.2 A Standard Form for Closed-loop Equilibria (Wt4)
When dealing with closed-loop equilibria in nondeterministic
games, it will be easier to discuss problems formulated in a manner
which facilitates dealing with questions of measurability and infor-
mation. The following standard form is adequate for the purposes of
studying pure strategy closed-loop Stackelberg equilibria and is
based on a similar form proposed by Witsenhausen for stochastic control
(Wt4).
Let (Xt, t) , (Ut, F t), t = 0, ...2N be measurable spaces. For
t = 0,...2N-1, let Dt be a a-field contained in t.' The state transi-
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tion function ft:Xt x U + xt+l is measurable from 7t x Ft + -t+
1 2
Let T0 be a probability measure on (X0, 0) and w2N'~2N be
bounded, real-valued functions defined and measurable on (X2N, 72N ).
The set of admissible strategies rt is the set of all functions
Yt:Xt - Ut such that yt is measurable from Dt to Ft. Let
r = r0 x ... x r2N-l
For any choice of y E r, the equations ut = yt(xt), xt+l =
ft(xt, ut) determine the variables ut, xt as functions of x0 in
the probability space (X0, 70r' Y0). Thus, xt and ut are well-defined
random variables with probabilities induced from this original pro-
bability space; similarly, the quantities 2N(X2N), 2N(x2N) are also
well-defined random variables.
The problem of finding a closed-loop equilibrium between two
players can be formulated as follows: Let r = rl x r3 x ... x r2N 1
and re = r x ... x r2N_2. It is assumed that the players enact their
strategies alternately (in Stackelberg fashion) so that the first
player acts at stages 0, 2, ...2N, and the second player acts at
stages 1, 3, ...2N-1. Then, a closed-loop equilibrium is a pair of
* 0 e* e
E-Z - ( 2N X2N)) < Ey Y ( (x e r (4.1)
E(2N 2N 2N 2N)
0*e* 20 e* 2 0 0
E 'Y- (2N(x2N)) < E - (2N(2N)) Ys r . (4.2)
where the expectations are superscripted by Y to indicate the explicit
dependence of the probability density of x2N on the choice of strategy
y.
An interpretation of the above standard form is the following.
There is an initial random state x0. This state undergoes determin-
istic state transitions ft up to state x2N. At each stage a decision
maker bases his decision on partial information about the current
state. Each decision maker seeks to minimize a function i of the
final state x2N. In the next section it is shown that this standard
form is general enough to include problems formulated in Chapter II.
IV.3 Conversion of Dynamic Games to Standard Form
The mathematical form presented in Section II.1 can be con-
verted to standard form in the following fashion, where to avoid
overlap in notation, terms referring to the standard form of the
previous section are underlined.
Let X be the space containing all of the uncertainties in
-o
the formulation of Section II.1. That is, let e £ X be defined as
-o
O (x 0 0, 0, {ett, }t N-1). The probability density E0
is defined as the joint probability density of the random variables
included in x.' The a-field Z-0 is then the product of the Borel
fields Bq, BP in the obvious way defined in Chapter II. The decision
1 1
spaces (U, F ) are defined as (U , F) = (Ut, G); (U2t+, F2 ) =M t -- tl -;-2t t t --2t+l z-2t+l
2 2(Ut. Gt).
Define the states x2t £ X as x (x .
-;;-2 t `_-2 t -;;22t (OO' 't.·2- ' t
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2 1 2
t O i i i=O .. .N-l and 2t+l = (2, ), t = . N-1
The variables J1 J2 are real-valued variables related to the costs,t' t
as will been later. The a-fields St are defined as the product
a-fields of the a-fields of the individual components of t, where the
1 2
a-fields of Jt' Jt are the Borel a-fields of the real line.
The state transition function can be defined as follows:
-2t -2t' -2t= (-2t' -2t)
1 2
f (x2 2t+(X = (xO' HO' 2t+l ' jt+l' t+l' 
{ei E1i, 2 i) (4.4)
{i i i=O,...N-l
where
xt+1 = ft(x, t, ,t )l (t' t 2t' U2t+l' t
j = i + ht(x
t+l Jt + t ' u2t' u2t+l)
i
JO = 0.
As required in the standard form, f is a deterministic function
from X x Ut + +1' Furthermore, since ft and ht are appropriately
t 
measurable functions of their arguments, then f is measurable from
x F to 
The last concept which must be incorporated is the notion of
available information to the players, embodied in the a-fields Dt
In the formulation in Section II.1, equation (2.2) defined measurements
Yt which were available to the players. These measurements are deter-
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ministic functions of the new state variables x_2t; these functions
determine a subfield of Z on which yt is measurable. Witsenhausen
(Wt2) and Ho and Chu (H5) have discussed in detail how to define the
subfields D in terms of the measurement equations (2.2). Briefly
-t
described, equation (2.2) can be rewritten as
i i i
Yt = gt t ( xt = gt
The measurability assumptions on gt enable the sequence Y0''' to
2 2induce a field D on X . Similarly, y0' 2yt induces a field on
X~~+-2t
--2 t+l '
1 2
The cost functions ~2N and (2N are defined as
1 l1 1
4 2N(X2N JN + hN()
2N(-2N)= J= + LL(NJ
The conversion to standard form is now complete. The concept of state
has been expanded to incorporate the uncertainties of Section II.2.
In terms of this new state, the concept of available information can
be posed in terms of C-fields of the state space, determined a priori
because of the deterministic nature of the new evolution function f
and the measurement equations. The notion of admissible strategies
is then reduced to questions of measurability. In the next section
this standard form is used in describing closed-loop Stackelberg
equilibria.
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IV.4 An Equivalent Deterministic Problem
A closed-loop equilibrium for a game expressed in standard form
is still a stochastic problem, as indicated by the fact that the
elements of X0 are random elements. Following a similar development
by Witsenhausen (Wt4), this problem can be reformulated as an equiva-
lent deterministic problem by considering (in the notation of Section
IV.2) the unconditional probability density t of xt as the new state.
Let It be the Banach space of signed measures on (Xt, t), with
the norm being the total variation norm. Similarly let 1t be defined
as L (xt , R), the space of bounded real-valued St-measurable functions
with the supremum norm. For ~ e ~t' 7T E t' define the relation
< f, T> = If (x)dr(x) (4.5)
Xt
Equation (4.5) establishes a form of duality between it and nt
as each of these spaces defines a norm determining set of bounded
linear functionals on the other. The probability measures ft repre-
sent a closed convex subset of Ht. The given WT0 belongs to this sub-
set of H0. For any t, Yt Frt, define gt( · , t) :Xt + Xt+1 by
gt(xt; Yt) = ft(xt, Yt(xt)). Similarly, define Tt(yt):It + TIt+l as
(Tt(Yt) ) (E) = r{xIgt(x; t) E} E E E Ct+l (4.6)
Note gt is measurable from Zt to t+l, and Tt(y) is the probability
measure induced in Xt+l by the use of strategy Yt in the function
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g( · ; ¥t)
For any t,y, Tt(Y) is a map of unit norm. Define dually
T*(y):, +t by
t t+l t 
[T((y) tl(X) = t +l (gt(x;Y)) e x X. (4.7)
The maps Tt(y) and T*(y) are adjoint in terms of the relation-
ship (4.5) as the rules for change of variable yield
< T, t(Y)¶> = <T*(y)4, T> ¥ ~ £ ~t+l' T EC It
In the equivalent deterministic problem, it is the state, with state
space II t The admissible decisions are elements of rt. The state
evolution equation is given by equation (4.6). The costs are linear
functions of the final state, given by
i i
J = <2N' N> ; i = 1,2. (4.8)
In this problem, player 1 chooses his strategies for even stages and
1 2
player 2 chooses his for odd stages. Two sequences of costates t, ,t
can be defined in terms of equation (4.7) for each decision sequence
Y = (y , y ) as:
i i
t = (Y t+l; i = 1,2; t = 0,...2N-1
where 2N is given in equation (4.8).2N
Theorem IV.1: A necessary condition for y* = (Y , Y ) to represent
10 20 0
a closed-loop equilibrium to the game is: Let 't ~ t and et be
the associated costates and states with Y* arising from equations (4.7)
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and (4.9). Then,
1* 1 10 0
(i) For t even, J = (<*) 10 0
10 0
= min <~t+l' Tt(Yt) t
(ii) For t odd, J 2* (Y*) 20 >0t t
20 T0>.
= min <~t+l' Tt(¥t)
Proof: From equations (4.7), (4.8), (4.9), it follows that J (y*) =
0 'i 0
<2N' 0 2N> =<t' Ft> for all t. Assume t is even. Consider
= r' . -1' i t' Y +1'' 2*N-l) where yt e rt.
' '''¥t- 1 ¥ t+l ¥2N-1 )
From (4.6), ~t = Tt- (Yt-l)Tt-2 (t-2) 'To (Y0) 0' Then it is the
1 i
same for y and y*. Similarly, (4.7) implies t+l = T+l(t+l) 
T2N l ( 2N-l ) 2N so  t+l is the same for yl and *.
1Now, J1 (Y1 = 10 10 T(Now, J1(y ) <+ t+l' t+ = <t+l' Tt(t)
> 1 10 
>_J (I ) (t+l t=t t
because _* is an equilibrium as in equation (4.1) so, (i) is necessary
at the equilibrium point. A similar argument for t odd establishes
(ii).
A notion which is very useful is that of determining the
coreachable sets for each player; that is, the sets of costates which
he can achieve using his strategies. In contrast with control theory,
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these sets will depend in general on the decisions of the other
player. Define the coreachable sets Pt(22N; Y) and Pt(42N; e) as
1 0 0
p(2N ) Yt = U T(YtPt+l(2N; Yt) if t even
¥t rt
= T*(Yt) P+l0(2N; 0 if t odd, where yt  y
Pt(2N; =) = U T*t(Yt)Pt+l(2N; 4t) if t odd
P 42N; e) =Tt()Pt+l(2N; ) if t even, where y £ ye
(4.10)
with the initial conditions P2 N (42N; 2N ) = {2N} and P2N2N; N =
2N
The elements of pt( 1; 7Y) and p t(4; ye) have the same norm
as 4) and 42 for all t, hence the coreachable sets are bounded. Since
the criteria are linear in the costates as seen in Theorem IV.l1, the
achievable performance by each player in the face of the other player's
decision sequence can be characterized in terms of the support function
of the coreachable sets.
Define the support function of Pt(4; Y) as
Vt; 2; ) = sup <4, 7T>t 2N' It 1 0
t (2N Itt) (4.11)
V2 (Tr, 24
t 42N; ) = sup <4, 7>
4 C Pt (2N' t)
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The boundedness of the coreachable sets implies Vi are
t
Lipschitz continuous with constants || 2N||. With this terminology
it is now possible to specify a procedure which yields a pair of
strategy sequences which are a closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in
the game.
e* 0*
Theorem IV.2: The sequence of strategies Y* = (Y , Y ) obtained
recursively by:
(i) for t even, y*(r) = arg sup Vt+l (Tt(t) ; +1
¥t t
(ii) for t odd, y¥*() = arg sup Vt+I(Tt(Yt)T; -2N e*+1
arg sup 2N' +1rt t
where the suprema exist and are admissible strategies for all 7 E It,
and since f0 is known, the values of et and yt are obtained from (i)
and (ii) to yield y*, is a closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium to the
game (i.e., satisfies equations (4.1) and (4.2)).
Proof: Equation (4.10) defines a recursive relation between coreachable
sets. Assume t is even; then
1 1 0
Vt(T; - %2N; Yt+1) = sup <t, A>
% E Pt(- 2N',t+l
= sup sup <T (Yt) ),F>
1 0 Y EF t
f Pt+l(- 2N' e4+1 t 
from equation (4.10)
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- sup sup <, Tt (Y) Tr>
yt rt 1 0
¥t t E £ Pt+l(- 2N, Yt+l)
= sup V (Tt(Y) -N 0t+l (4.12)
Yt r t
Also, V(T; 42; Ye) = sup <2? 7T>
t (-2N; -t
= sup <T(y)' rr>
2 e
S Pt+l(-M2N; Yt+l)
= V (Tt (YelTr; _)2N X+ 2 (4.13)
Similarly, for t odd, equation (4.10) implies
2 2 e 2 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Vt -2N; - Vt+l (Tt(Yt)7; 2N' +2(4.15)t 2N' - t+l
Equations (4.12)-(4.15) define recursive relations for the support
functionals V and V2
Now, assume y* = (Y , YO*) satisfy the conditions of Theorem
IV.2. Consider the problem of maximizing the expected value Jl1 (y,
O*). From the definition of support functions, the optimal value
is VP(wTr; 4-; Y). *() satisfies the conditions of Theorem
IV.2, then equations (4.12) to (4.15) establish that
1 1( ; 1 v1 1 0*
t - 2N' ) = Vt+ 1(Tt(()) ; 2N t+l1)
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for all t. In particular,
VO (r 0; ; = V2N(T 2N-1 2N-1 T2N-2 2N-2)
..T0 (Y*)7r0 ; -2N )
The expression on the right is the value resulting from using y_
obtained in the conditions of Theorem IV.2, while the expression on
the left is the optimal value attainable. Hence
I. e* 0* 1 1 0* 1 e 0*
E{J1 (e , )} = -V°1 -r 2N; I ) < E{J (L y )}
fe e
An identical argument establishes the inequality for y¥0 r0.
That is,
2 e* O* ) -2 O 2 e* 20< 2 0
E{J 2 ( , )} = -_V (7-2N; 
Theorem IV.2 establishes the validity of a dynamic-programming
approach at finding closed-loop equilibria in non-deterministic games.
1 2The expressions V1 and Vt are the optimal costs-to-go from a given
state ft assuming knowledge of the other player's future strategies.
The alternating framework used by the players enables a recursive
algorithm to be carried out. At stage 2N-1, player 2 can choose his
optimal strategy Y2N_1 (). Using this knowledge, player 1 can then
1*
choose his strategy Y2N 1(T). Equations (4.12)-(4.15) provide the
recursive relations for defining the evolution of the support functions
used in parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem IV.2, in terms of the optimal
decisions y¥. Thus, Theorem IV.2 provides sufficient conditions for
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the existence of a closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium; namely, the
existence of the various suprema described for the set of admissible
strategies. If all these suprema are admissible strategies, then
Theorem IV.2 offers a constructive method for obtaining a closed-loop
equilibrium.
IV.5 Example
Consider the following finite-state game, with one stage.
Initially the state is 0. The next state is one of a possible 8 states.
There are no transitional costs, only a cost associated with each final
state, which is the same for both players. The state transition func-
tion is stochastic, described by
we 1 2
where U0 = = {0, 1} and 80 is random, taking values 0 and 1 with
equal probabilities. The information structure is such that player 2
does not know the value of 80, but player 1 does. Finally, player 1
is the leader, and makes his choice first.
The extensive form of this game is shown in Figure IV.1, where
the costs have been indicated at the final states. This game problem
can be reduced to the standard form of Section IV.2. The initial state
is (x0, e0 ) with the C-field product of 4, {O}f for x0 and ~,' {0},
{1}, {0,1} for e0. The probability density is the product of two
marginal densities, assigning therefore values 1 to outcomes (x 0,0) and
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(X0, 1).
The state at the next stage is (80, uO), the transition de-
scribed in the obvious way. The information field D1 is now the
produce of the power set of U1 and {, {0,1}} for e Notice D is
a proper subset of E1, the power set of X0 x UO.
The transition to the next stage is again trivial, mapping
X1 x U1 + X2 by fl((e0, ul), u2) = (80, u1, uo). Z2 is again the
power set of {0, 13 . The admissible strategies r0 and r1 are the
sets of all maps from X0 and X1 respectively into {0, 11, measurable
on DO and D1. Only pure strategies will be considered admissible.
2 1 2
u0
UO 0
1 1g0= 0 9
x0=0
Fgr1 I i. 
Figure IV.2 Extensive form of game
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The numbers at the end of the branches of the tree in the ex-
tensive form represent the costs associated with the particular out-
1 2
come of the game. Hence, the play 0 =0, uO =1, uO =0 results in
a cost of 3. The cost is identical for both players.
Using thM terminology of Section IV.2, the costs, in terms of
the probability 7T2 induced in X2, are
8
ji = 72 (x(x 2)(x2 )
i=l
where ~ is the cost associated with terminal state x2. Using Theorem
IV.2,
(71) = sup <T1 (Y1) 1; ->
81 
= sup ( 72 (x2)(x 2)), 7R2 = TI(Y1 ) 71'
y Frl i=l
Since only pure strategies are admissible (this restriction is not
essential; by a detailed argument the same results can be obtained for
mixed strategies or behavior strategies [ K2 ]), there are four
admissible Y1, listed as
a Y1(0o u1) = O
b Y1(e0, ul) = u1
1 1
c Y1 (e0, ul) = 1- u
d y1(80, ul) = 1
The resulting costs for each of these strategies in terms of 71 are
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tabulated in Table IV.3.
Strategy Cost
a -(211(0,0) + 611(1,0) + 7T1(1,1) + 371(0,1))
b -(27 1(0,0) + 6 1(1,0) + 571(1,1) + 411(0,1))
c -(T1r(0,0) + 9T1 (1,0) + +(1, 1)  3(01))
d -(11(0,0) + 971(1,0) + 5X1(1,1) + 41T(0,1))
Table IV.2 Costs associated with yl
The space of all probability distributions can be divided into
four regions, over which one of these strategies is optimal. However,
the problem can be simplified when only pure strategies are admissible,
since now there are only four possible distributions 11. Table IV.3
lists these distributions, together with the corresponding optimal
strategy Y1 and cost-to-go V1
1*
r1 Optimal Y1 Cost V
1 1 1 1
1 r1(0,0) = 1 1(1,0) = a or b -4
2 1 2 1 2 == 2 d -3
31(0'0) = , T1(1'1
3 1 3 1
3 11(0,1) = 21 13(1,0) = 2 a -4.5
4 1(0,1) = 2, 11(1,1) = 2b or d -5
Table IV.3
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Similarly, yO = argsup (vl*1 (To(Y0)0; ; 1
0 F0
Again, there are four possible strategies, identifiable as
a YO(80) = 0
b y0(00) = 00
c yO(8 0 ) = 1 - 80
d Y0(80) = 1
Each of these strategies maps 70 into a distribution in Table IV.3,
where V* is also computed. Hence, y¥ is such that TO(y*)Wo = Wl'1 00 1 
This strategy is YT = b.0
Thus the equilibrium pair of strategies are y* = b, y* = d with
an associated cost of 3. Even though this example is very simple, it
highlights the difficulties in applying the techniques of Section IV.4
in constructing closed-loop equilibria. The spaces et of all proba-
bility distributions are very large, and hence the maximizations of
Theorem IV.2, which must be carried out for each element of the space,
are unrealistic. In this example, through independent arguments the
cardinality of w1 was reduced to four elements. These arguments will
not hold in general; the determination of closed-loop equilibria is an
untractable problem in most cases.
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IV.6 Signaling-free Equilibria in Stochastic Stackelberg Games
When the nature of the game is stochastic, so that the infor-
mation available to each decision maker at stage t can be different,
signaling-free equilibria in Stackelberg games are no longer closed-
loop equilibria. Signaling-free equilibria differ from closed-loop
equilibria in that the players wait until stage t to choose their
decision at stage t (rather than committing themselves to a strategy
prior to the game), and do not assume that previous decisions were the
output of strategies. These differences were presented in mathematical
form in Chapter II, as well as some basic results for deterministic
games. This section discusses signaling-free equilibria in stochastic
games. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, it is assumed that
the state, decision and observation spaces Xt, Ut, Yt are finite-
dimensional Euclidean spaces, with associated fields the Borel
C-fields.
In Chapter II, equations (2.17) through (2.22) define
signaling-free equilibria in Stackelberg games. These equations are:
1 ( 1' 2* 1 - 1 2*
It(, Ut-l' Yt ' xt ) < It Ut-1 2t, a-e. (4.14)
2 - 1 1' 2* 2 - 1* 2
I2(t, ut-1' t' Yt+l' Yt ) < I( t t o, ul ut t a.e.t
(4.15)
N-1
for all admissible y £ r' t, where I is defined byt ' t
t=O
2 - 1 2 2 1 2 2
IN-1(" UN- 2N-' 1tYN-1 ) = E{JN-1(WUN-2 2 N- 1 YN- 1 ZN-1 a.e.
(4.16)
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-_ 4 -1N)E{JN-1( N-2'N -1a.e. (4.17)
IN-1 UN_2,_ 1 UN_2 1 N 1
2 1 1 2 2 12It (WUtUt,-l' t+l, Yt) = E{ht (xt,utut)
+ I t+l( u t'ut+l' +2'4+1) I z t
1 1 - 2 2 - 1
Ut+l = t(WUt)' Ut = Yt(W,Utliut)} a.e. (4.18)
1 - 1 2 1 12 1 1 2
I t t-1 '_ot) = E{h t(xt,utut) + I (WUt, t+l )lzt,
1 1 - 2 2 - 1
t = t(W,ut_l) ut = ¥t(,ut-lut)} a.e. (4.19)
1 1 1 2
where Zt+ = (Zt' u t u)
2 2 2 1
Zt+l = (zt, u t, Ut+l)
Admissible strategies yt are jointly measurable functions of w and
past decisions ut 1' measurable for each sequence of decisions ut_1
on the fields F{ut _l}, to reflect the fact that previous strategies
are assumed to be constant. Admissible yt satisfy equivalent measur-
ability constraints. The expectations in equations (4.16)-(4.19) are
conditional expectations with respect to the probability measure P
in (Q, F , P ); the elements inside the expectations are well-defined
0 0
random variables defined on (Q, F , P ) as discussed in Chapter II.
The following lemma establishes a different representation of
admissible strategies:
Lemma IV.3 (D1). Let xl(w),...x (w) be n real-valued random variables
defined on a probability space (Q, F, P). Let B be the smallest
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O-field contained in F where {xi(M)} are measurable; i.e., the field
induced on Q by the Borel fields through {xi (W)}. Let f(w) be any
B-measurable function. Then, a a Borel-measurable function g(x ,...x )1 n
such that
f(w) = g(xl(w), ...xn ()) a.e.
The proof of this lemma is given in (D1) and (BZl). This lemma
^i i i
establishes the existence of Borel-measurable strategies Yt :Zt +Ut
'ii i -
such that Yt(Zt(W)) = Yt(, ut 1) a.e.
As pointed out in Chapter II, equations (4.16)-(4.19) are
conditional expectations, hence defined only up to an equivalence class
of a.e. equal functions. The elements It refer to one arbitrary member
of this equivalence class; in terms of this formulation, conditions can
be stated for finding the optimal signaling-free strategies.
Theorem IV.4: Suppose there exists a pair of admissible strategy
sequences , 20, satisfying
1 - 10 20 1 - 1 10 20
I (wU t-i,-Y '°t ' ( wut -1 Yti)+ 1 i, ) a.e. (4.20)
2 - 1 10 20 2 - 1 10 20 20
I I t ,te.I t Utl' t,' +1'iI ) < It(ut l'ut'Yt+l'tt '+1 ae
(4.21)
0 10
except for w in a fixed P -null set Et independent of ut, for all admis-
sible t t, ut. Then 10 20 constitute a signaling-free equilibrium.
10 20
Proof: At stage N-l, clearly the strategies NN-l' ,N-1 satisfy
equations (4.14) and (4.15). Hence assume inductively that (4.14) and
10 20 10 20(4.15) hold for Y-+1' 2+1; that is, 1 and 2 satisfy the signaling-
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free inequalities for t > T + 1, almost everywhere except for fixed
0 i
P 0 null sets Et. Then, by assumption, for t = T,
1 - 10 20 1 - 1 10 20
I t( t -l'u <IY t ) Ia.e.
1 1 2 1 - 10 20 1 1 1 -
E{h (x , u) It+l ''u +l ,Y-t+1 t ' ut = Yt(w'ut-1)'
2 20 1
t = Yt (W'ut-1 ut)} a.e. by equation (4.19)
< E~h1 x 1 2 + - 1 20 )1z1 , 1 
<{ht(Xt' t'u ) + It+(''lY l (Wlt'U = U '
- E t tut) t+l (W'Utt+1 l t = t t ut - 1 '
2 20 - 1
= yt (,ut l,ut)} a.e. by equation (4.14) and
the inductive assumption
1 - 1 20 1
It( 'ut-1 't ' It ) for admissible Y .
10 20Hence, Y , Y satisfy equation (4.14) for t = T. A similar argumentestablishes that 10 , 20 satisfy equation (4.15) for t = T. Hence,
by induction, y and 20 satisfy equations (4.14) and (4.15) for all
t, and hence constitute a signaling-free equilibrium.
Theorem IV.4 establishes the validity of a dynamic programming
approach in finding signaling-free equilibria in stochastic Stackelberg
games; furthermore, since all signaling-free equilibria must satisfy
equations (4.20) and (4.21), Theorem IV.4 yields necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of signaling-free equilibria. The
implications are that these equilibria can be characterized alternately
in terms of an equilibrium between 2N independent players, each acting
only once during the game. This property was mentioned earlier in
discussions of signaling-free equilibria in deterministic games, in
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Chapter II.
Theorem IV.4 yields an obvious constructive way of obtaining a
10 20
signaling-free equilibrium: Define the strategies yt ' yt recursively
by
10 1 - 1 10 20
Y 0t (W ut-1 ) =argmin It (, utl, U I +t+l't ) a.e. (4.22)
u
20 1 2 - 1 10 2 20
20( ut- 1 u) = argmin It(W, Ut-l' ut' Yet+l U I t+l a.e.
u (4.23)
The random variables minimized on the right side of the equation treat
i i
u as constants, whereas I is defined as a conditional expectation
because these strategies yt are measurable on the conditioning a-fields
defined by zt (Brl). The only problem with this constructive technique
10 20
is that the strategies yt ' ,t so obtained need not be admissible
strategies; that is, there is no guarantee that they will be appro-
priately measurable functions. Striebel (Strl) discusses properties
of the class of admissible strategies which guarantee the existence
of an appropriate minimizing Yt . For the special case where the
field induced by zt is separable (generated by a countable collection),
(4.22) and (4.23) yield admissible strategies.
For a special subclass of games called LQG games, the assump-
tions of Theorem IV.4 are satisfied. This results from the Gaussian
nature of the uncertainty in LQG games. Furthermore, the constructive
technique described in Theorem IV.4 yields admissible strategies which
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are appropriately measurable. Chapter V studies in detail signaling-
free equilibria in LQG games.
The costs represented by equations (4.16)-(4.19) are in general
different from the truncated costs which occur in the closed-loop
equilibrium concept. Hence, proposition II.4 of Chapter II does not
hold in general stochastic games: A signaling-free equilibrium pair
of strategy sequences does not have a corresponding pair of closed-
loop strategy sequences which constitute a closed-loop equilibrium.
However, in some special cases a correspondence exists between these
two concepts. Define a game of equivalent information as a game where
1 - 2- 1 -
t (t-= Ft (Y Y ) for all t, all admissible ¥t. The following
theorem relates closed-loop equilibria to signaling-free equilibria:
Theorem IV.5. In games of equivalent information, every signaling-
free equilibrium 10, y has a corresponding closed-loop equilibrium
le 2e such that
E{Ji( le, 2e E{Ioi( 10 20
Before proceeding with the proof of this theorem, some prelim-
inary results need to be established.
Definition IV.1. The actual cost-to-go Jt are functions such that:
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1(i) Jt:Q x U0 x U 0x U Ut x rt x r t x ... r x
2 +R +
x r 2 RNlx 
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 R+
(ii) Jt:xU x ... U x t x t x. N-1x N-l
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(iii) Jt(W, Ut-l' 4) is the cost associated with a play
of the game with strategies (ut, i) and the original
random variables determined by w.
The next theorem relates the notion of expected cost-to-go to
actual cost-to-go.
Theorem IV.6. In games of equivalent information,
1 - Y ) = - -(
, u ) = E{J1 (, Ut ) z 1 2} a.e. (4.24)
t t- t t-1' t t
2 - 1 2 2 - 1 2 2
It(w, ut-1 ' ut, Yt' +1) = E{Jt (W, ut-1 u1 , yt' Y zt} a.e.
(4.25)
for all admissible y, all t. The conditional expectations are with
1 
respect to the fields Ft {utl}.
Proof: For t = N-l, equations (4.24) and (4.25) are identical to
equations (4.16) and (4.17), which define IN1l Hence the theorem
is true for t = N-1. Assume inductively that the theorem is true for
t > T+l. Then,
1s
EJT (W1 2T- -1 TI T
EE u12U(T
-
u _1 _, uTl)) E{hT(XT(W), y2T(w, uT-1 t yt(w T y1 (wT UT1 +
T+1(W UT-) IZ1} a.e. by definition
1 2Since the game has equivalent information, both yt and ¥t are measurable
1-
on the conditioning field FT{UT 1. Hence, their value can be substi-
1 1 - 2 2
tuted in the expectations. That is, let T = YT(W UT_1), uT = YT(
- 1 1to event 1
UT-l uT) for all W corresponding to the event zT(w, UT-l) = ZT. Then,
-103-
1 - p1,- 1 1 1 2
T T-l T UT-1 T T UT UT)
1 - 1 2 1 -1 1 1 --
T+1 UT-1 UT UT, Y+l ) ZT(' UT-1) = ZT' UT = T-1)
2 2 - 1
UT = YT(W, UT 1 , u)} a.e.
1h( 1 2, ) + 1 1 2 + ZTla+I1
-- 1{(XT' UT' UT) + jT+{ (' UT-l' UT' T' ZZ UT +) T
1 1 - ) 2 2
UTYTCT UT UT = T(', (, 1) a.e.
la 1 1 2 1
because the conditioning field specified by ZT+l = (ZTI UT, UT YT+l)1
1 - 1-
FT+1 ( FT (Ut-1
1 1 2 1 - 1 1 -
=E {hu (XT, U UT ) + IT+1 UT' 1) IZT T UT = YT(W UT-l)'
2 2 - 1
=T T(,= UT-l' uT)} a.e.
because of the inductive assumption on I 1 and J1
T+l1 T+l
IT( , uT-_, YT) a.e. from equation (4.19).
A similar argument establishes (4.25) for t = T. Hence, by induction,
the theorem holds for all t.
Notice where the condition of equivalent information is used.
In general games, Y is not measurable on Ft {u l}, so that the valuet t t-1
2 2 - 1
t = (W, Ut, ut1 ) cannot be substituted in the conditioning expec-
tation. Theorem IV.5 can now be proved.
Proof of Theorem IV.5
10 -
Consider Yt ( ut ). By Lemma IV.4 and the measurability
onsier t t-1 
^10 1 1
assumption in Chapter II, there exists a function Y :Zt Ut'Borel
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'^1\0--1 10 -
measurable, such that Yt (yt(, u )' t = Yt (, a.e.
"20 2 2
Similarly define Yt : Zt Ut
ie ie
For each w, define the random variables y (w), ue (w) as thet t
"10 "20
outcomes of the play of the game with strategies it ' . Clearly,
j1 10 20) = j(10, 20 ..
J (y J (Y , Y ) a~e.
2c s c l Ic ^20 -2e -e
Recursively define strategies Y (, -l' Yt ) =t ( Yt (), ut 1 (),
le lc -c ^10l --
ut (w)) a.e. and y t(yt ) y(yle(W), u ()) a.e.t 't-l t ' t -1
lc 2c IcThen, the construction of y t, 2c imply that tc is measurable on
-1 -
the field induced by the random variables Yt' ut-1 defined through the
strategies t That is, t is measurable on F(Y1 ) . Similarly,
2c 2-c lc lc 2c
¥t is measurable on Ft(t-1' Yt ). Thus, y and y are admissible
closed-loop strategies. Furthermore,
i(lc 2c) 2c i 10 2 a.e.
by construction. Thus, from Theorem IV.6,
E{E(Ji( lc 2c } = E{I(w 0 20
= E{Ji(y , ¥ c )} a.e.
^lb
Assume there is an admissible closed-loop strategy l such that
1"lb "2c 1 ^c "2cE{J (Y b, 2 )} < E{J y ', y }
The representation ^lb Z + U is used here for convenience. Then,
t t
ld -
define y t (w, ut-1) as the random variable produced by the use of
id -
constant strategies ut 1 in the play of the game. Define ytd(, u 1)
by
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ld - lb --id - -
¥t u1 = t 1) tl
Id
Then, by construction, yt is a jointly measurable function of W and
1- 1Utl; as a function of w it is measurable on F {u }. Thus t is
ld
an admissible signaling-free strategy. But, the way Yt was con-
structed,
Jl1( ld 20) Jl(lb Y2c a.e.
Hence,
E{J (Y d Y)} = E(J (Yb ))2
< E(J (l , )
1 10 20
E(I 0 ( , Y Y
1 10 20 1 id 20
In particular, since I0(w, Y , < IO N , ) a.e. by the
equilibrium property of y , y 0 and
E{J (y , 2 _ )} = E{E{J (d, Y20 I)zO}
= E{I (w ld y20)} by Theorem IV.6,
then this leads to a contradiction. Thus, for all admissible closed-
^1loop strategies Y
E{J l(y, 2)} > E{J ( C , )}
A similar argument shows
2 (^1c^2c ( lc, ^2
E{J 2 (l c, 2c)} > E{J2 (l )}2
^2 2 2for all admissible 2 :Zt + Ut.
Hlc, 2cHence, (y , y ) is a closed-loop equilibrium.
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IV.7 Example
Consider the game in extensive form presented in Section IV.5.
This is not a game of equivalent information. The signaling-free
Stackelberg equilibrium can be obtained from Theorem IV.3
2* (u) = argmin E{JhN(XN )|u1 }
2
u
1
= 0 if u0 = 0, cost-to-go 4
= 1 if u = 1, cost-to-go 4.5
Y0 (e0) = argmin E(J (u, YO(U))o)
u
= 0 if 60 = 0, I= 2
= 1 if 00 = 1, I =5
In terms of strategies in Section IV.5,
2* 1 1 1*
YO (u) = u0 , Y (=0) = 8o
with expected cost of 3.5. The signaling-free equilibrium is not a
closed-loop equilibrium, as the strategy Y0 (u) = 1 yields a lower
. °
expected cost for player 2. Similarly, suppose now that the extensive
game is of the form shown in Figure IV.4.
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0 2
1 - 1
00=0
x0= 00=0 0 6
1 =1
0=1 1 0 5
Figure IV.4
This game can be decomposed in a manner indicated by Kuhn (K2);
the decomposition is similar to searching for a signaling-free equili-
brium. The admissible strategies for player 1 are now
1 1
Y0 = 0, = 1.
The signaling-free equilibrium strategies for player 2 are the same.
That is,
2* 1
YO = O'
1*
It is easy to inspect that y = 0, with expected cost of 4. Further-
more, consider
21* 2 2
E(J2( , ))(= 4 if y 0 (0) = 0
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-5 if y2(0) = 1.
2* 2*Since y0 () = 0, then, for all y2 admissible
2 1* 2 2 1* 2*E(J2 (y0 , Y0 )) > E(J (y0 ))
Hence the signaling-free equilibrium is a closed-loop equilibrium in
this case.
In general, the assumption that the players will not make any
assumptions as to the strategy used by other players in the past
prevents the players from deriving additional information about W
from observation of each other's decisions. Hence, the signaling-free
equilibria will be different from closed-loop equilibria, where learning
is permitted. In the special case where the players have equivalent
information about the uncertainties, then nothing can be learned from
observation of the other player's decisions. In this special case,
Theorem IV.5 establishes the equivalence of signaling-free equilibria
and closed-loop equilibria.
CHAPTER V
Signaling-Free Equilibria in LQG Stackelberg Games
V.1 Introduction
This chapter studies signaling-free equilibria in a class of
games where the state evolution equation (2.1) is linear in the states,
controls, and noise, the observation equations (2.2) are linear, and
the costs (2.3) are quadratic. Furthermore, the uncertainties are
assumed to have a joint Gaussian probability density. For this impor-
tant class of games, signaling-free equilibria can be found exactly.
The first part of the chapter deals with the solution of games with
nested information; that is, when one player (the leader) has knowledge
of all the information available to the follower. The second part deals
with the solution of games with general information.
Throughout this section, the following notation will be used:
Matrices are denoted by upper case letters, vectors by lower case
letters, stages by arguments of a function, (t). The notation for a
function z on its value at stage t is z(t). Euclidean n-space is Rn.
Lower case greek letters denote Gaussian random variables of zero mean,
while upper case greek letters denote their covariance. M' is the
transpose of M, tr(M) its trace. Gaussian random variables will be
indicated as x = N(x,Z) where x is its mean, X its covariance. With
this notation, the class of problems considered is described in the
following section.
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V.2 Problem Statement
Problem 1: Consider the stochastic multistage game where x(t),
the system state at stage t, evolves as:
x(t+l) = A(t)x(t) + B(t)u(t) + C(t)v(t) + 8(t), t=O,,...N-l (5.1)
Yl(t) = Hl (t)x(t) + 1l(t) (5.2)
y2(t) = H2 (t)x(t) + 62(t), t=O, ... N-1
where x(t) E R n, u(t) £ Rm, v(t) C R , yl(t) C Rp , Y2 (t) £ Rq for all
t. The vectors 0(t), El(t), 2(t) and x(O) are independent gaussian
random vectors for all t, where x(O) = N(xO, 10); O(t) = N(O, O(t));
i(t) = N(O, Ei(t)). The matrices A, B, C, H1 and H2 are bounded for
all t and of appropriate dimensions. In equation (5.1), u(t) represents
the decision of the leader, v(t) the decision of the follower. Under
these assumptions the state vector x is a discrete Gaussian Markov pro-
cess whose evolution is described by (1).
At the start of the game, each player seeks to mimimize the
expected value of costs Ji, where
N-1
J. i(x,u,v,O) = x' (N)Qi (N)x (N) + (x'(t i (t)xQi(t)(t)
t=O (5.3)
+ u'(t)R.(t)u(t) + v'(t)Si(t)v(t)); i = 1,2
At a given stage t, the information z. (t) includes exact knowledge of
the system dynamics (1), the measurements rules of both players (2) and
and the cost functional.s of both players (3). Additionally, they include
exact knowledge of all decisions made by each player up to stage t-l
and the statistics of random elements e(t), l(t) and 2 (t) for all
t. The leader's and follower's information z.(t) contain the values
of all measurements up to stage t available to the leader and follower,
respectively. Additionally, the Stackelberg nature of the game implies
that the follower's information z2(t) contains the exact value of the
leader's decision at time t, u(t).
Signaling-free equilibria for Stackelberg games are defined
in Section II.3 by equations (2.17)-(2.22). Furthermore, theorem IV.4
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequence of admissible
strategies to be a signaling-free equilibrium in terms of a constructive
procedure described in equations (4.20) and (4.21). In terms of the
LQG problem statement, these equations can be written as
Y,0 (zt)) argmin E{x'(t)Ql (t)x(t) + u'R(t)u
u (5.4)
+ v'sl (t)v + J(t+l)zl(t), v= ( t))
20 (z (t)) = argmin E{x'(t)Q2(t)x(t) + u(t)R2(t)ul(t)t 2
v . (5.5)
+ v's (t)v + J* (t+l)Iz2(t), u(t+l) t+l (z (t))2 2 2 ' = t+l 1
~ A ~10 20 10 20
where J (t+l) = I1 ( z J*t+) = I ((t), + )111 t+22(t+l) -t
The solution of equations (5.4) and (5.5) can be obtained recursively.
The expected costs-to-go at the Nth stage for the players are:
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J*(N) = E{X' (N)Q1(N)X(N) Z1(N)} (5.6)
J*(N) = E{x' (N) Q2 (N)x(N)I 2 (N)} (5.7)
The solution of these equations is now straightforward. The next
sections discuss the solution of these equations for some special cases
of the problem stated previously.
V.3 The Deterministic Case
Suppose both players have perfect information of the state,
as a special case of problem 1. Then, since z (N) and z2 (N) both contain
knowledge of x(N), (5.6) and (5.7) become
J1*(N) = x'(N)Q 1 (N)x(N) (5.8)
J2*(N) = x'(N)Q2 (N)x(N) (5.9)
Make the inductive assumption that JQ*(t) = x'K (t)x + I(t), a = 1,2
for some deterministic matrix KL(t) and function te(t). This assumption
is established in appendix 2 using the principles of dynamic program-
ming. The equilibrium strategies are:
u*(t) = -W(t) Y(t)x(t) = (x(t)) (5.10)
v0 (u,t) = -(S2(t) + C'(t)K2 (t+l)C(t)) C'(t)K)K2 ( t+l)(A(t)x(t)+B(t)u(t))
20 
= -A(t)(A(t)x + B(t)u) = 2 (x(t), u(t)) (5.11)
where, dropping the argument t for brevity,
W = R1 + B'A'SlAB + B'(I-CA)'K (t+l)(I-CA)B (5.12)
---12 1)1
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Y = B'A'S1AA + B' (I-CA)'Kl(t+l) (I-CA)A (5.13)
L = Q1 'AS AA + A' (I-CA)'K l (t+l)(I-CA)A (5.14)
This assumes the required inverses exist. Further on sufficient conditions
for the existence of these inverses are stated. The optimal costs-to-
go are
J1*(t) = x'Kl(t)x + Tl(t) (5.15)
J2*(t) = x'K2(t)x + IT2(t) (5.16)
where
K l(t) = L(t) - Y'(t)W (t)Y(t); K (N) = Q(N) (5.17)
nl(t) = l(t+l) + Tr0(t)Kl(t+l) ; i (N) = 0 (5.18)
K2(t) = Q2 + (A-BW -Y)' (K2 (t+l))(I-CA)(A - BW1 Y)
-1 -1 (5.19)
+ Y'W R2W Y; K2(N) Q2(N)
12 (t) = T2(t+1) + T {((t)K2 (t+l )}; T2(N) = 0 (5.20)
The right hand side of the four equations depend only on known para-
meters of the game (i.e., A(t), B(t), etc.) and future values of the
cost-to-go matrices K (t) and K2 (t), nl(t) and T2(t). Thus, they are
solved backwards in time using the initial conditions K1 (N) = Qi(N),
K2 (N) = Q2(N), TI (N) = 0 = T2 (N).
The solutions of these equations provide equilibrium feedback
matrices for the implementation of the adaptive Stackelberg strategies.
Figure 1 contains a block representation of the equilibrium strategies:
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VI
x(t) A (t 
1J -tT x (t+l)
Figure V.1
Notice that the follower implements his optimal strategy after the
leader does so. Still, the existence of a solution is not guaranteed
unless W1 exists for all t, and (S + C'K2 (t+l)C) exists for all t.2 2
Furthermore, the solutions given must minimize the expressions for
1J1(xIUrvit) and J2(x,u,v,t).
to-go is thus non-negative so Klt) > 0. Thus, from (20), W is positive
definite, hence invertible. Similarly, if we let Q2 and R2 be positive
semidefinite, and S2 be positive definite, then (S2 + C'K2 (t+l)C) is
invertible. In addition, these conditions ensure that the functionals
minimized are strictly convex over the whole space, so the minimums
are unique. Thus, the optimal strategies (5.4), (5.5) are the unique
equilibrium signaling-free Stackelberg strategies for problem 2, under
the conditions previously described. The next section examines the
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the more general case where measurement noise is present in the problem.
V.4 The Stochastic Case
Consider the special case of problem 1 where the leader knows
both Yl(t) and Y2(t) in (2), whereas the follower knows only Y 2 (t).
So, for any t, zl(t) Dz2(t), implying that the information sets are nested.
In addition, note that neither player can assume the other has played
optimally in the past. This assumption is implicit in the definition
of signaling-free equilibria; it is stated here explicitly so that
the possibility of information transfer between players through their
controls is avoided completely.
The optimal strategies for this problem are derived in Appendix
2 as
v0(u,t) = -A(t) (A(t)x2 + B(t)u) = Yt (z2(t)) (5.21)
U -1 -l 1
u*(t) = -(t) Y(t) W(t) M(t) (x - x) =1 (z (t)) (5.22)
Ji*(t) = I+l(t) (5.23)
x K1A(t) K (t)2 K lB C 2t1
J2*(t) = x 2'K (t) 2 + I2 (t)
where xl(t) = E(xlz l(t)), x2(t) = E(xlz2(t)), W(t), A t) and Y(t) are
defined in (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) as in the deterministic case
with K1A(t) replacing K1 (t). The following equations are derived in
Appendix 2:
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K1A(t) = Q1 + A'A'S + A A' (I-CA)'K1A(t+l)(I-CA)A-Y'WY (5.25)
K B(t) = A'A'S1 AA + A' (I-CA)'K1A(t+l)(I-CA)A (5.26)
+ A'(I-CA)' (K1B(t+l)-K1A (t+))A
- A' (I-CA)'K1B (t+l)G 2 (t+l)H2 (t+l )A - Y'W- M
M(t) = B'(I-CA)'K1A(t+l)) (I-CA)A + B'(I-CA)'(K1B(t+l)-K1A(t+l))A (5.27)
+ B'A'S1 A - B' (I-CA) 'K1B (t+l) G2 (t+l )H2 (t+l)A1 1B 2 2
K1C(t) = -M'W 1M + A'A' (S1 + C'K1A(t+l)C)AA (5.28)
- 2A'A'C'K 1B(t+l)(I-G 2 (t+l)H2(t+))A
+ A' (I-G (t+l)H2 (t+l))'K1c (t+l) (I-G2 (t+l)H2 (t+l))A
(5.29)
1 l(t) = Il(t+l) + Tr{(yl(t+l t) - Zl(t+l) (K1A(t+l)-2K1B(t+l)+K1c(t+l))}
+ Tr{G t2 t+lt+l)-2K (t+t)(2K(t+)-2K l )}
+ Tr{l(t)Ql(t)} + Tr G2 (t+l) ( 2 (t+l)+H 2 l1 (t+llt)H2)
G'K l(t+l)}
K2(t) = Q2 + (A -BW )' (K2 (t+l) -A'C'K2(t+ Y) (5.30)
+ Y'W 1R2W Y
2(t) = 2(t+l) + Tr{f2 (t)Q2 (t)} + Tr{( 2(t+1lt)- - 2 (t+l))K 2 (t+ l) } (5.31)
+ Tr{( 2 (t) - l(t)) (M-Y)'W- R2 +B'(K 2 (t+1)-A'C'K2 (t+l))
BW -1 (M-Y)}
where the initial conditions are K1B(N) = Kic(N) - 0, K1A(N) = Q1(N),
K2(N) = Q 2 (N), 1(N) = Tr{ 1i(N)Q1(N)}, IT2 (N) = Tr} 2 (N)Q2 (N)}. As in
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the deterministic case, existence and uniqueness of the optimal Stackel-
berg strategies follows from assuming S2 > 0, R1 > 0, S1, R2 ,Q1 'Q2 >0
for all stages. The right hand sides of equations (33)-(39) can be
determined at stage t if the cost-to-go matrices K1A(t+l), K1B (t+l),
KlC(t+l) and K2 (t+l) are known. Initial conditions at stage N are
known, so these equations can be solved backwards a priori, because
the only terms involved are the parameters of the game A(t), B(t),
etc. which are known to both players, and the covariance of the
estimates, which can be computed a priori.
There are several important aspects in the solution. First,
the recursive relations (5.25) and (5.30) are identical to the
relations (5.17) and (5.19) in the deterministic case, with the same
initial conditions, so that the solutions K1A(t) and K2(t) in (5.25), (5.30)
are equal to Kl(t) and K2(t) in (5.17) and (5.19). Thus, as far as the
follower is concerned, he is playing a "separation principle" strategy
which consists of the optimal deterministic feedback law of his best
estimate of the state. The leader, on the other hand, knows both
his own estimate and the follower's estimate, so that his optimal
strategy includes a term taking advantage of the difference in esti-
mates. When both estimates are the same, the leader also plays as
in the separation principle of optimal control.
A special case of problem 1 would be the case where the follower
has no measurements, in which case G2 = 0. Another case of interest
is where the leader has perfect information on the state, in addition
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to knowing the measurements of the follower. In both of these cases
the information sets are nested, so z1 Dz 2. If the information sets
were not nested, then both players would be unable to estimate the
other player's estimate at each stage. Thus, at each stage, the
optimal strategies would include, in addition to their own estimates,
terms involving the estimate of the other player's estimates of the
state in the future. Carried out to N stages, the augmented state
vector would be roughly of dimension 2nN for each player.
This leads to estimators of much larger dimension than the
system itself, hence it is impractical. An interesting variation of
problem 1 is where, instead of knowing the other player's past de-
cisions exactly, there is some channel noise involved, so a noise-
corrupted version of the decisions is known. If this noise is zero-
mean, additive, Gaussian and statistically independent of the other
noises in the system, then the equilibrium signalling-free strategies
remain unaffected, but the expected optimal cost increases. The
reason for this is that neither player extracts information from the
other player's past decisions. Thus, past decisions merely affect
the mean value of the random vector x(t), and to include additive
channel noise with the above properties would just leave x(t) as
a Gauss-Markov process with increased covariance. It has no effect
on the equilibrium because of its independent with the other random
elements in the system implies that the conditional expectations of
x(t) given zi (t) would not be affected.
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---- 
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V.5 LQG Games with Nonnested Information
This section discusses signalling-free equilibria in the LQG
games of section V.2 when the players' information is nonnested. The
main result of this section is theorem V.1, stated below:
Theorem V.1: For LQG games with nonnested information, signaling-free
equilibrium strategies are affine functions of the active information
zi(t) = (u(0), v(0), Yi(O), ..., Yi(t)) where the coefficients are
predetermined by the parameters of the game.
Proof of Theorem V.1:
The proof is by induction on N, using theorem IV.3 to find the
equilibrium strategies. From equations (5.4) and (5.5),
N-1 = argmin E{x'Q2 x + u'R 2u + v'2v + x' (N)Q2 (N)x(N)IZ 2(N-l)}
where the argument N-1 has been ommitted for brevity.
Since x(N) = Ax + Bu + Cv + 0, the above minimization can be
carried out as in appendix 2, yielding
20N- (z2(N-1)) = - (S2+C'Q 2 (N)C) C 'Q 2(N ) {A E {x lz 2(N - l) } + Bu} (5.32)N-1 2 2 2
= A (z (N-1))
~~~~2 2
where A2 is an affine operator mapping z2 (N-l) into UN_1 whoseN-i
coefficients depend on the parameters of the game, as shown in
i i i i
Appendix 1. Let At be the class of affine operators At from Zt + Ut t t t
such that the coefficients are computed apriori from the parameters
of the game.
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From Appendix 1, it also follows that
^2 20 2 2 2
IN_ (z2 (N-), YN-1 Z (N-l) z (N-1)+LNZ2 (N-l)+T N-l
where KNli' LN and NIT are determined by the parameters of the
game. Similarly, equation (5.4) implies
N-1* = argmin E{u'Rlu+x'Qlx + x(N)'Q (N) + v'SlvlZl(N-1), u,
u
= AN (z 2 (N-1))} (5.33
= argmin E{2xt(Ql+A'Q (N)A)x + u'(R 1 +B'Q 1 (N)B)u
u
+ v' (S1 +C'Q 1 (N)C)v + 2u'B'Q1 (N) (Ax+Cv+8)+2v'C'Q1 (N) (Ax+e)
+ 2x'A'Q (N) 6 + 0 1 Q (N) I A (z (N-l))=v}
+ 2x'A'Q(N) + e'Ql(N)u , AN_-1( 2
The expectations in (5.33) can be considered individually. For any
matrix M, E{x'Mxlzl(N-l)} is shown in appendix 1 to be a general
quadratic in zl(N-1).
E{u'Mxlz (N-l), u} = u'ME{xlz l(N-l)}
E{x'MO} = 0, E{e'Me} = Tr{OM}
^ =N1}=A 1uv = E{vlz- (N-l), uv = A (Z2 (N- -l)) (Ez (N z(N-l),u
Entries in z2(N-l) are of the form y2 (t), u(t), v(t). u(t) and v(t)
are known constants in 1 (N-1), so from equation (5.2),
E{Y2(t)I (N-1)} = H2 (t)E (x(t)I z (N
-1 ))E lN- 2 1 2 IlN-1
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Thus, since every entry of E{z2(N-l) IZ1(N-1)} belongs to 1' then
Etvlzz(N-1),u,v= A2 (z2(N-1))} is a general quadratic in terms of1 N-i 2
zl(N-i) and u. Similarly,
E{v'Mvlz l (N- 1), u, v = A (z2 (N-1))} =
v' Mv + Tr{ME}
where E = E{(v-v) (v-v Z(N-1), u, v = A2 (z2 (N-l))}. Consider a typical
entry of (v-v)(v'-v'). It is of the forms 0, or
(y2(t)-Y2(t)) (Y2(T)-Y2(I)) )
2
since v S XNl1 so that v-v has entries 0 (corresponding to u(t), v(t))
or a(Y 2(t) - Y2(t))
It is shown in appendix 1 that E{(y2 (t ) - 2(t )) (y2(T)-y2(T))'Iz (N -1 )
is a quadratic in z (N-l) which can be computed apriori from the para-
meters of the game.
Also, E{v'MXlzl(N-l), u v = A (z (N- 1 ))} =
E{E(v'Mxlz l (N -1), z 2 (N-l)) Izl(N- 1) , u, v = A 2(z (N- 1 ))}2 2 1 N-i 2
= E{v'ME{xlz (N-
-1) , z2 (N-l)}z (N- 1), u,v = A
2 N-
From Appendix 1, E{xzl (N-l), z (N-l)} is an affine function of zl(N-l)
and z 2 (N-1). Using the results from the previous expectations yields
E{v'Mxlz (N--), u, v = A (z (N-1 ))} is a general quadraticin zl (N- 1) . Thus, (5.33) can be expanded; when expectations
in z1 (N-l), u. Thus, (5.33) can be expanded; when expectations
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are taken every term is at most a general quadratic in zl(N-l), and u
then (5.33) can be rewritten as
z (N-1) M L \ (N-l)
YN 1 (Zl(N-1l)) argmin( ) (L' N )Nl I + (5.34)
I1(N-1)
LLN-1 u uN-1
where M, L, N, LL and R are determined a priori from the parameters of
the game, and the matrix
{M L
L' N N-
is positive semidefinite, and the matrix N is positive definite. This
is guaranteed by the definiteness assumptions discussed in section V.3.
Hence, since for all zl (N-1), (5.34) is a minimization in Euclidean
space,
101 (z (N-l)) = A (z (N-l))
N- 1 N- 1
where Ai s k 1 and
N-, 1 1
J*(N-1) = zl(N-l) z (N-l ) + LN-Z1 (N-l) + N- (535)Now, assume inductively that, for t > T + 1,(5.35)
Now, assume inductively that, for t > T + 1,
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1 10 1 1
I (z (t) ) = (t z (zt) + L z (t) + I' (5.36)
2 10 20 2 2 2
t (z2(t) y t+l t ) = z (t)Kz 2 (t) + L z2 (t) +ttz2 t+l ' 2 t t
jo i
and Y (Zi(t)) . Then equations (5.4) and (5.5) imply
2*
yT (Z2(T)) = argmin E{x'2x + u'R2u + 'Sv +(5.37)
2 2 
+ z2 (T+l)K z (T+l) + L z (T+)T+Z2 ) T+
+ +l2 Iz2 (t), v, u(T+l) = 10(z(T+1))}T+1 2 T+1 1
where the subscript T was ommitted for brevity. Taking expectations as
before, the first three terms are general qudratics in z2(T), U(T)
The third term becomes
1 zl 1 1
E{z2 (T+1)Mz (T+1) z2 (T), vUT = AT+ (z (T+1))}
2' )z2 2' 'T + 1)(T+)T+I
= E (2) M + 2( )) ( )
v v (T+l)
f2(T+1) t y2 (T+1)
(T+1) u(T+1) 
z 2 T)a Mb
Since z (T+1) = v(T) and M = 
2 Y2(T+l) Mb Mc
u(T+l)
The first two terms are general quadratics in (T)). The last term
-124-
can be shown in a fashion identical to the case for t=N-l, to be a
z2(T)
general quadratic of , since y2(T+l) = H2(T+l) x(T+l) + 2 (T+l) so
~y2(T /l2j) v Z2 (T)
Ey2 (T+l)1 2 i\is an affine function of 2 Thus (5.37) can be
rewritten as
Y20 (2 (T))= argmin KT20 +LT + T20
2 2 2 2
A2 (z2 ) where A2 AT T T T
because the function to be minimized is a convex quadratic functional of
v over Euclidean space.
Similarly,
10 ( T) armXT (Zl(T))=argmin E x'Qlx + u'Rlu + v'Slv (5.38)
+ z (T+l)' K (z (T+l) + LT+lzl(T+l)
1 l T+l 1 T +i)
+ +1,v=T(Z )
Taking expectations, the first two terms yield general quadratics in )
fVI z1(T) 2 2 IS(T i
E{VISlvI(1) V = AT(Z 2 (T))} = VS 1 V + Tr(IT S 1)
where v = E{A (z (T))Iz (T), U}
IE{(v-v)(v-v)'jzl(T), u, v=AT(zT)}
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From appendix 1,
V's v is a general quadratic in (zl(T), u)
21 is a constant determined a priori.
Also, E{z (T+1) 'Mz (T + 1) I z(T), u, v=A2( Z 2( T ) ) }1 1 1 T2
~= (? ()) M (: )+ 2 k M E z 1 (T) U, V=IAT(z 2 (T))
+ E Mc( ) Z(T), u, v=A 2(z2 (T))
1 (T+1) Y (T+1) 1 T 2
which is also a general quadratic in (z1 (T), u) by a similar argument
based on appendix 1. Therefore, (5.38) can be expressed as
YT10(z (T)) = argmin ( ) LK0 + 10
11 1 T
= AT (z (T)) where A1 X
T T
and J*(T) is a general quadratic in z (T), so1 1
J*(T) = z(T)Kl (z (T)) + LTZ1 (T) + H1
1 1 T 1 T1 T
Hence the theorem is proved by induction.
Theorem V.3 describes signaling-free equilibrium solutions of
LQG Stackelberg games without nested information. Similar to the
results of section V.4 for the nested information case, the equilibrium
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strategies are linear functions of the available information. In section
V.4, these functions were linear in terms of two n-dimensional vectors
xl(t) and x2(t) which summarized the information at stage t. In the
nonnested case, the equilibrium strategies cannot be expressed in terms
of vectors of lesser dimension than zl(t) or z2(t). The strategies are
still linear maps of the information but; the information cannot be sum-
marized in terms of two n-dimensional vectors. The added structure in
the nested case permits the development of the solution in a fashion
similar to the separation principle of optimal control; in the case of
nonnested information, the equilibrium strategies are linear, but not
related to the "separation principle".
CHAPTER VI
VI.1 Summary
Chapters I and II describe a general formulation of stochastic
dynamic games. Within this formulation, several concepts of solution
are studied, describing relative properties of these solutions. Sig-
nificantly, these are properties associated with the general definition
of the solutions as opposed to properties of the solutions in particu-
lar games. Two solutions are of particular interest: closed-loop
equilibrium solutions and signaling-free equilibrium solutions. The
concept of signaling-free equilibria is introduced to represent
equilibrium solutions in games where a type of information restriction
is present.
Chapter III discusses two examples which illustrate the results
of Chapter II. The first example has a finite-state, finite-decision
structure; it illustrates the methodology used in obtaining solutions,
and points out the abundance of closed-loop equilibria with different
costs. The second example has a two-state continuous-decision struc-
ture; it highlights the fact that in dynamic games solution concepts
with dominant assumptions, such as the closed-loop Stackelberg solu-
tion, threats are a natural part of the optimal solution. Even in
equilibrium solutions, a milder version of threats exists because of
the ambiguity present in when strategies are chosen.
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Chapter IV examines the problem of obtaining closed-loop and
signaling-free equilibria in general stochastic dynamic games. For
closed-loop equilibria, games are expressed in a standard form. Using
this standard form, necessary conditions for equilibria are estab-
lished, in terms of an equivalent deterministic problem which considers
the unconditional probability density of the state as the new state
of the system. A constructive technique for finding equilibria is
established, thereby yielding sufficient conditions for a sequence of
strategies to be an equilibrium.
The second part of Chapter IV deals with signaling-free
equilibria. A constructive technique is described which provides a
sufficient condition for equilibrium of a pair of strategy sequences.
In special games with equivalent information for both players, it is
shown that every signaling-free equilibrium is equivalent to a closed-
loop equilibrium. This equivalence does not hold in general games,
as shown by a counterexample.
Chapter V deals with signaling-free equilibria in a special
class of games, called LQG games. Under the assumptions of LQG games,
signaling-free equilibria can be obtained constructively. For general
information it is shown that equilibrium strategies are affine func-
tions of the available information, and the expected costs-to-go are
quadratic functions of the available information. Under the restric-
tion of nested information between players, the equilibrium strategies
can be expressed as linear functions of a constant-dimension suffi-
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cient statistic. For the player with least information, equilibrium
strategies follow the "certainty-equivalence" principle of optimal
control theory.
VI.2 Discussion
There are numerous decision-making problems in various disci-
plines which can be modeled as dynamic games. Furthermore, each
problem contains an intrinsic set of assumptions which indicate what
solutions the different decision-makers are trying to achieve. The
major thrust of this dissertation was to explore a class of solutions
(equilibria) in dynamic problems characterized by alternate decision-
making (Stackelberg games). There is considerable argument relating
to the value of equilibria as solutions in non-zero sum games (H4 ,
Au2, Shl). Equilibrium solutions are important in a large class of
problems.
Prior to this research, most of the work dealing with equilibria
concerned itself with closed-loop equilibria. The classical theory of
games includes existence theorems for closed-loop equilibria in finite-
state, finite-decision games (K2); additional work has been done in
establishing existence and uniqueness of equilibria for classes of
dynamic games (Ba2). Using some of the properties of Stackelberg
games, this dissertation provides general theorems relating to
necessary or sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria in an
abstract formulation. Additionally, it provides the basis for con-
structive approaches to obtain equilibrium solutions. Hence, the work
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in the early part of Chapter IV provides a direct generalization of
classical finite-state game theory to abstract games.
The second class of equilibria discussed in this dissertation
is the class of signaling-free equilibria. This solution concept has
not been studied before except under very special conditions ( Ao2).
However, it is a solution concept which rises naturally in dynamic
games. Closed-loop equilibria are formulated in terms of both players'
complete strategy sequences. At stage t, players have observed past
decisions by all other players. Closed-loop equilibria assume that
those decisions were the outcome of equilibrium strategies, whereas
signaling-free equilibria make no assumptions as to which strategy was
used in the past. Closed-loop equilibria thus represent a solution
which is completely determined before the game is ever played, in terms
of strategies; the players are assumed to have an unbreakable commitment
to their equilibrium strategies. Signaling-free equilibria, on the
other hand, make no assumption as to past strategies; hence, in the
presence of non-equilibrium play by a player, the remaining strategies
are still in equilibrium. Signaling-free equilibria therefore repre-
sent a solution which is determined as the game is played; the a priori
commitment to strategies is not an essential part of the equilibrium
solution.
The second half of Chapter IV studies signaling-free equilibria
in general dynamic games. A constructive approach towards obtaining
these equilibria is described using dynamic programming ideas. Several
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conditions must be met before this constructive approach can be com-
pleted, concerning questions of measurability and existence of minima.
Specific games, such as LQG games discussed in Chapter V, meet these
conditions naturally.
The two classes of equilibria are closely related in many cases.
Particularly, in games of equivalent information, signaling-free equili-
bria · correspond to closed-loop equilibria. For LQG games, the condi-
tions guaranteeing the existence of signaling-free equilibria are met.
The equilibrium strategies are affine functions of the available infor-
mation at each stage for each player. Under a particular information
constraint, these optimal strategies can be expressed in terms of a
pair of sufficient statistics in a manner reminiscent of the "separation
principle" in optimal control theory. It is important that, for this
class of games, signaling-free equilibria can be readily obtained.
VI.3 Areas of future research
There are three main directions in which to continue the re-
search topics discussed in this dissertation. The first direction lies
in the area of applications. There are numerous examples of decentral-
ized control theory, hierarchical systems, and large-scale systems which
can be modeled as dynamic games. Using the constructive techniques of
Chapter IV (in a fashion similar to Chapter V), one obtains equilibrium
strategies in this important class of games. Some of the other solution
concepts discussed in Chapters II and III are useful in examining large-
scale systems. The special structure of problems in hierarchical systems
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and large-scale systems can be exploited to develop stronger results
than those developed for general games in this dissertation. Also,
in a fashion similar to Sandell's (Sa3) development of Finite State,
Finite Memory control problems, the results can be specialized to
FSFM games.
The second direction is closely related to applications; it
consists of developing numerical methodology for obtaining approxima-
tions to solutions of dynamic games. This is essential to solving
practical game problems. Chapter V provides algorithms which obtain
signaling-free equilibria for LQG games. However, for general games,
no practical methodology is given. This problem is currently under
study.
The final direction of research lies in the theoretical area of
exploring existence and uniqueness questions of signaling-free equili-
bria. The theorems discussed in Chapter IV have some restrictive
assumptions which are not easy to verify in general problems. The
theoretical issue lies in weakening those assumptions, or replacing them
by assumptions which are easier to verify in general dynamic games.
There are fundamental questions in functional analysis which relate to
these problems, and must be examined closely.
APPENDIX 1
Discrete Time Estimation of LQG Systems
Consider the dynamical system described in equation (a):
x Atxt + Blut + B2tut + t = ....N-l (a)
t+1 t t t t t t B
with measurement equations
t = Htxt + t ; i = 1,2; t = 0, ...N-1 (b)
n i i
where xt is the state vector at stage t, xt £ Rn; At, Bt, Ht are
real-valued matrices of appropriate dimension; ut is a known constant
vector in R , u2 is a known constant vector in Rq; t are observation
mi 1 2
vectors in R . The variables 8t, t t and it are random variables of
1 2
appropriate dimension, such that for any tl,t2,t 3, et ' t ', t are
1 2 t3
mutually independent.
1 2
The random variables Et , Et' it are assumed to be Gaussian
-1 .2
in density, with mean 0 and covariance Qt', t,' 2t respectively, denoted
(for et ) by et = N(O, 9t). Furthermore, the initial condition x0 is
assumed to be unknown and independent of other variables, where
XO = N(xo, ). Assume also that Ott t > 0 for all t. The problem
at hand can now be expressed as follows: Consider the LQG game of
Chapter V. Given a sequence (yl, ...YT) of measurements, and decisions
1 2 1
(uT,...UT 1) , denoted by zT, find the values of
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Xt = E{xt z
~t --St E{(xt-xt)(xt-xt)',zT
for all t < T.
This problem is standard in estimation theory (Asl, Aol)
The solution can be described as follows.
t At (At) + t (c)
X X+ + t (H )'( ) (Y -Ht+lxt+ ) (e)
t+l t+l t+l t+l t+l t+l t+l +t+l t+l t+l
(f)
AT At t t -1 t AT
xt xt ZtA'Ct+) t+l t) (g)
where t < T.
T t t t -1 t T t t -T(h)
t t t t t+l t+l t+l t t t+l
t Ati0 = ' xO = X for t = -1. (i)
Equations (c), (f) and (h) depend strictly on the a priori parameters
of the game: the system matrices and the noise covariances. With the
initial conditions given in (i), these three equations can be solved
recursively to obtain + for any value of t < T. Equations (d), (e),t+l
and (g) are equations containing terms from the active information
i 1Ut, Ytand parameters of the game. As indicated before, the covari-
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T
ances St can be computed from the a priori parameters of the game.
Thus, equations (e) and (g) can be rewritten as
^t+l ^t 1 1 1 lt
Xt+ l = t+ + t+ t+l(Yt+l(Yt+l ()
^T ^t 2 ^t ,T
Xt = xt - Kt(xt+l - xt+ 1 (k)
1 2
where Kt, Kt are matrices determined by the parameters of the game.
^t
Recursive solution of equations (d) and (j) establishes xt+
t+l
as an affine combination of {uk , Uk and xt as an affine
U2k' Yk k=0,...t t
combination of {u k u2 1} and yl1 where the coefficients are
' k k=O,...t-l t
AT
determined by the parameters of the game. Similarly x t can be ex-
pressed as an affine combinations of {ykl 1 , Uk k yT withk' uk=O,...T-l' T
coefficients determined by the a priori parameters of the game.
In particular,
E(ytIz = Ht Xt
which is an affine function of zT.
Also, for t < T
2 22,M 1zll = 2 2 T 2FTH2, +2
E{Yt'Myt (H tM(Ht + Tr{MT(H t t -t
which is a general quadratic expression in terms of zt with coefficients
determined a priori.
Similar relationships can be established for player 2's infor-
mation y * 2 1 2 1 2 1mation {y y and {u U0 , ... Ut-l' Ut-1 u 
APPENDIX 2
Consider the problem of Section V.4.
Let xi(t) = E{x(t)Izi(t)}, i = 1,2.
Ci~.)= E{(x(t) - xi(t))(x(t)- i(t))'!zi(t)}
Ei(t+lit) = EO{i(t+l) zi(t)}
xi(t+l) = xi(t+lIt) = E{x(t+l)IZi(t)}
JO(N) = xi'Qi(N)xi + Tr{Ji(N)Qi(N)} (a)
where i. (N) = E{(x - i.) (x - i) 'lzi (N)}.
Assume that, at stage t, the optimal expected costs-to-go are
given by
J1*(~l(t) K ( K (t(t)
J*(t KXtWlt (Kt K
1
B ( 2 > ) + 1l(t)
2(t) 1(t KIB(t) K1C(t) 2 (t
(b)
J2*(t) = (t) 2(t) K x 2 ( t) + I2( (c)
These assumptions are consistent with (a). Proceed by induction to
show that the above assumptions are indeed true. From (5.4) and (5.5),
the optimal strategies are given by:
20
¥t (z2 (t)) = argmin E{x'Q2x + u'R 2u + v'S 2 v + 12(t+l)
+ x2'(t+l)K 2 (t+ 2()x2(t+l)z 2 (t) (d)
Taking expectations, equation (d) becomes
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20
¥t (z2(t)) = argmin [2' 2 2 2Yt Z2(t)) = argin Q22 + u'R2u + v'S2v
v
+ xI(t+llt)K2(t+l)x2(t+llt) + I2(t+l)
+ Tr{f2Q2 } + Tr{(C2(t+l1t) - C2(t+l2(t+ (t+1)}]
From equation (d) in Appendix 1, (d) becomes
20
Yt (z2(t)) = armin {x2'(Q 2 + A'K2(t+l)A)x2
v
+ u'(R2 + B'K2(t+l)B)u + v'(S 2 + C'K2(t+1)C)v
+ 2v'C'K2(t+l)(Ax 2 + Bu) + 2u'B'K2(t+l)Ax2
+ b2(t)} (e)
where b2(t) = 12(t+1) + Tr(Z2Q2) + Tr{(C2(t+llt - E2(t+l))K 2(t+l)}.
Differentiate now with respect to v and obtain the minimum:
Yt (z 2(t)) = (S2 + C'K2(t+ )C)(t+l)C) ^ 'K t+1)(Ax2 + Bu)
- A(Ax2 + Bu) (f)
Notice that A(t) is defined as it was in equation (5.11). Using
equation (5.4), one gets
Yt (z(t)) = argmin E{x Qlx + uRlu + vo (u,t)Slv 0 (u,t)+ Tl(t+l)
Xl.1A (t+ l) K1B (t+l) l(t)xx)}
For any matrix Lone can determine the following expec (t+l)atio s:
For any matrix L,one can determine the following expectations:
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E{x1(t+l)Lxl(t+l) lzl(t)} = x'(t+l)Lx(t+l) + Tr{(El(t+l)It)
-Cl(t+l))L} (h)
E{ l(t+ l(t) = EE[ (t+l)L x 2 (t+l = {E 2 (t+l)1zl(t)
U z2 (t+l)]1 zl (t)} (i)
because Zl(t) U z2(t+l) induces a refinement of the partition induced
by zl(t) alone. The inner expectation can be rewritten using the
results of Appendix 1 as
E{x{(t+l) L 2(t+l)Iz l(t) U 2 ( t + l ) } =(t+l) = t+l)z(t)
U z2 (t+l)}'L 2 (t+l) (j)
Since z2 (t+l) U zl(t) involves adding the information of the measure-
ment y2 (t+l) to zl(t), then
E{x lz 2 (t+l) U zl(t)} = E{xlz 2(t+l) U zl(t)}
= x(t+l) + 2(t+l)H(t+1)2 (t+l) (y2(t+l) - H2(t+l)xl(t+l))
(k)
where x1 = E{x1z 2 (t+l) U zl(t)}, = E{(X-x1) (x-x 1) 'Zl(t) U z2 (t+l)}.
The argument t+l is dropped for brevity. From Appendix 1, one also
knows
2 o,2 2H22 (2i) becomes22)
So, (i) becomes
E{ iLx21z l(t)} =
_1 2 __-] _ , \ ,/ -,-1, - .I , 2. 
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Now, Y2 conditioned on zl(t) is a gaussian random variable with mean
H2xL and covariance H2Z1(t+llt)H
~
+2. So
E{xLxIz(t) = 'iLx2 + x'LG2H2 xl-x2) - + Tr{El(t+lIt)LG H }
where G2 = H -1 (m)2 2 22
E{x'Lx 2 I 1l(t)} = E{(x2 + G2(Y2-H2x2))'L(x2+G2 (Y2-H 2X 2)) I Zl( t)
x Lx2 + 2x'LG2H2(Xl-x2) + Tr{G 22G'L+GH271 (t+ljt)H'G'L}
(n)
Expand (g) and take expected values using (h), (m) and (n):
Y 0t (zl(t)) = argmin {xj(t)Ql(t)xl(t) + u'(t)Rl(t)u(t)
+ (A(t)x2 (t) + B(t)u(t)) 'A'(t)Sl(t)A(t) (A(t)X2 (t)+B(t)u(t))
+ x'(K1A -2K1B+Kc)X 1 + 2x,(K1B-K1c)X2
+ 2x'(K1B-K 1c)G 2 H2 (X1 -X 2) + X2K1cX 2 + 2x2K1CG2H2(x -X2 )
+ (x2 -x )IH;G'KCGH 2(X2 xl) + Il(t+l) + Tr{fl(t)Q l (t)}
+ Tr{(El(t+llt) - E1(t+l)) (KA-2 KlB + Kic)
2G H ( llt) (K K 1C) + G (- + H2Z (t+1lt)H')G'K1C}22 1 B 1C 2\2 2 1 2 2
(o)
A-txt + 20
Since xl(t+l) = A(t)x(t) + B(t)u(t) + C(t)yt (z2(t))
= (I-CA)Axl + (I-CA)Bu - CAA(x2-x1)
x2(t+l) = (I-CA)Ax1 + (I-CA)Bu + (I-CA)A(x2-x1)
where the augment t was dropped for brevity. Substituting into (o),
and differentiating, one finds yt (z1(t)) to be
t 
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10 -1 1(P)
10(zl - w-l(t)Y(t)xlt) -wW Mt(t)-t 1()
where
W(t) = R1 + B' (I-CA)'KA(t+l) (I-CA)B + B'A'S1 AB
Y(t) = B'A'SlAA + B' (I-CA) 'K1A(t+l) (I-CA)A
M(t) = B' (I-CA) 'K1A(t+l) (I-CA)A + B' (I-CA) ' (KB(t+l) -
K1A (t+l))A + B'A'S1AA - B'( ('K1B(t+)G (t+)H2(t+1 )A
So, from (b),
J1*W K1A (t) K1B t (t) 
+ A' (I-CA) +(KlB(t+1)-KlA(t+1))
- A ' (I AI K - '(t)G (t)H t)K1C ( t) YB2 2t - (t)B (t) 2 -l(t
'q)
verifying the induction assumption made in (b), where
K1A(t) = -M'W 1M + A'A' (I
-
CA)'K1A(t+)C)A(I-CA)A- Y'(lW-t
K1B(t ) = A'A'SAA + A(I-CA) 'K1(t+l)( G2I-C A)At+
+ A'(i-cA) '(K1B (t+l)-K1A (t+l))A
-a' (I-CA) K1B (t+l) G (t+l) H2 (t+l) A - Y'W-IM
Klc(t) -M'W-i M + A'A' (Sl+C'K1A(t+i)C)AA-A'A'c ( (t+ l)
K1B(t+l)G2(t+i)H2 (t+i))A + A'(K1B(t+i) G2(t+l)H2(t+l)
-K1B (t+l))' C A A + A'(I-G2 (t+l) H2 (t+l)) 'Kl(t+l)
(I-G 2(t+l)H2 (t+l)) A
1(t) = Kl(t+l) + TrR{G((t+llt) - lK(t+l) - 2K1B(t+l)
+ K1C(t+l))) + 2 TR{G (t+l)H 2 (t+l) 1 (t+l t) -
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(K1B(t+l)- KlC(t+l)) }+ Tr{El(t)Q (t)}
+ Tr{G2 (t+1) 2t(t+llt) (t+l)
+ 2 (t+l))G2 (t+l)KlC (t+l) I (r)
Similarly, the optimal cost-to-go for player 2, the follower, is given
by:
J* = E(Q2 + A'K2(t+l)A)x 2 + u*'(R2 BK 2(t+l)B)u*
+ 2u*'B'K2 (t+l)Ax2 - (Ax2 + Bu*)'A'C'K 2 (t+l) (L 2 + Bu*)
+ b2 (t)Z 2 (t)}
x' 2(t)x 2 + I2 (t) (s)
This follows because E(xllz2 (t)) = x2, because Z2 (t) C Zl(t). The
optimal cost-to-go matrix is given by
K2 (t) = Q2 + (A - BW-y) '(K2 (t+l) - A'C'K 2(t+l)) (A - BW-lY)
+ Y'w-1 w-ly (t)
and
112(t) = 12 (t+l) + Tr(72 Q2) + Tr{('2 (t+llt) - z2 (t+l))K 2 (t+l)}
+ Tr{( 2(t) - El(t))(M- Y) 'W (R2 + B'(K 2(t+i)
- K2 (t+l)CA)B)W- l (M-Y)}. (u)
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